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PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: THE 
NEGLECT OF INCUMBENT PATIENT INTERESTS 
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The physician-patient relationship is unique in our society. 
Physicians! help safeguard one of the most important of human 
needs-health and well-being. Unfortunately, many physicians 
must balance the sometimes competing aims of providing 
personalized, high-quality care to their patients and running a 
profitable business. This tension is clearly evident in the current 
battles over the legality of physician restrictive covenants.2 
Those entities that employ physicians-such as Health 
Maintenance Organizations3 ("HMOs"), hospitals, and practice 
* Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Director, Weaver 
Institute of Law and Psychiatry; J.D., Duke Law School, 1991; B.A,. College of 
William & Mary, 1988. I thank Matt Malloy for his generous engagement with 
my work; Heather Lutz, Drew Brinkman, and Chris Kuhnhein for their 
excellent and resourceful research assistance; Jim Tomaszewski and Kevin 
Guerrero for their editing assistance; and the UC Law librarians for locating 
and obtaining materials. 
1. For the purposes of this Article, the term physician encompasses those 
persons courts define as physicians-all those licensed to practice medicine. 
Although this Article focuses on restrictive covenants as applied to physicians, 
the trend among courts appears to broaden the range of health care providers 
who are subject to such restrictive covenants, including nurse practitioners, 
physical therapists, medical technicians, and other health care professionals. 
See James W. Lowry, Covenants-not-to-compete in Physician Contracts: Recent 
Trends Defining Reasonableness at Common Law, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 215, 232 
(2003). 
2. Throughout this Article, the terms "restrictive covenant", "noncompete 
agreement", and "covenant-not-to-compete" will be used interchangeably. The 
terms refer to a clause in an employment contract that restricts the right of the 
physician to practice medicine within a specified geographic area for a specific 
amount of time after terminating employment. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 
392 (8th ed. 2004); 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAw OF CONTRACTS §13:1 (4th ed. 1995). 
3. An HMO is one type of prepaid medical service in which members pay a 
monthly fee for all health care, including doctors' visits, emergency care, 
hospitalization, lab tests, x-rays, surgery, and therapy. BARRY R. FURROW ET 
AL., HEALTH LAw §11-11 (1995). 
189 
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groups-often protect their business interests by using restrictive 
covenants.4 A physician restrictive covenant is a clause typically 
found in employment agreements between physicians and their 
employers that restricts the right of a physician to engage in a 
business similar to or competitive with that of the employer after 
the conclusion or termination of the physician's employmene 
Physicians are usually required by their employers to sign such 
covenants prior to beginning their practice. The contractual clauses 
obligate physicians to refrain from engaging in or establishing a 
competitive medical practice within a certain geographic region for a 
limited time period. The restrictive covenant typically will also 
prohibit a physician from treating patients at hospitals within the 
same geographic area.6 
Physician restrictive covenants have steadily gained in use and 
importance within the medical community, in part due to the 
increased professional mobility of physicians. Physicians today are 
more likely to change employers than in the past. Prior to 1990, less 
than two percent of physicians changed jobs during their career. 
Physicians entering the workforce after 1990, in comparison, had 
switched employers on average about three times before 2000.7 In 
fact, recent studies indicate that approximately ten percent of 
physicians may change jobs annually.8 Many of these physicians are 
unaware of the impact that restrictive covenants9 can have on their 
4. For an excellent historical perspective on restrictive covenants in 
employment contracts, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to 
Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625; 626-28 (1960). 
5. See, e.g., 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 80.16 
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003). 
6. See, e.g., Ballesteros v. Johnson, 812 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991) (examining a covenant-not-to-compete that specified seven hospitals 
where the departing physician cardiologists could not practice). For a thorough 
discussion of physician restrictive covenants, their impact on physicians and 
patients, and physician relocation policies, see generally Paula Berg, Judicial 
Enforcement of Covenants-not-to-compete Between Physicians: Protecting 
Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1992). The 
underlying assumption is that "most of a departing physician's patients will 
choose to be treated by the employer or by the departing physician's 
replacement rather than to follow the physician to an inconvenient location 
outside the covenant area." Id. at 4. 
7. Howard Markel, Doctors Now Need Well-Honed Skills In Job Hunting, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at F5. 
8. Id.; see also Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, More Docs Job Hunting, 
FAM. PRAc. MGMT., July/Aug. 2001, at 23. 
9. See Arthur S. Di Dio, The Legal Implications of Noncompetition 
Agreements in Physician Contracts, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 457,457 (1999) ("[U]nder 
current law, the physician-employee faces 'an uphill battle in challenging a 
restrictive covenant."); see also Derek W. Loeser, The Legal, Ethical, and 
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mobility and professional opportunities. lO Doctors are regularly 
forced to stop or relocate their practices due to the enforcement of 
physician restrictive covenants. Although a physician who chooses to 
leave a practice in spite of a restrictive covenant may suffer 
financially because of the loss of a patient base, the physician has an 
ongoing responsibility to the patients with whom he is no longer 
legally permitted to have a relationship.l1 Thus, for physicians, 
these covenants often present difficult economic and ethical 
challenges. 
Court opinions tend to emphasize the negative impact of these 
covenants upon the doctors themselves.12 However, individual 
patients of these doctors can also suffer from the enforcement of 
these covenants. A patient's quality of care is often directly affected 
by the stability of the patient's relationship with his or her 
physician, particularly in fields such as pulmonology and 
psychiatry. 13 Physician restrictive covenants can inhibit the 
formation of long-term relationships between physicians and 
patients and, thus, result in a lesser quality of care for the patient.14 
Practical Implications of Noncompetition Clauses: What Physicians Should 
Know Before They Sign, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 283, 284 (2003). 
10. Physicians expend significant time and energy developing professional 
relationships with hospitals and other physicians. When faced with a 
restrictive covenant, a physician must choose between staying in the 
employment relationship or leaving and effectively completely terminating his 
practice. See Brian Wyatt, Scrutinize Restrictive Covenants, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS 
DIG., June 1997, http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/697wyatt.html; see also 
Michael R. Burke, Limiting Restrictive Covenants, FAM. PRAc. MGMT., Apr. 
2001, at 50, 50. 
11. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 474-75. 
12. See, e.g., Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., 510 S.E.2d 880, 
885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a noncompetition agreement to protect the 
former employer's "legitimate business interests" in maintaining its 
"substantial patient base and network of referring physicians throughout the 
[protected territory)"); Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.w.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) 
(upholding the restrictive covenant because of the importance of respecting "a 
counterbalancing public policy . . . in enforcing contractual rights and 
obligations"), abrogated by State ex rei. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 
2004) (concerning the request for a jury trial in litigation arising from a 
restrictive covenant in a contract between a physician and a pharmaceutical 
company conducting a pharmaceutical trial). 
13. See Berg, supra note 6, at 31-34. 
14. See Debra Pressey, Sore Issue for Some Physicians, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA 
NEWS-GAZETTE, Oct. 5, 2003, http://www.news-gazette.com/news/ 
local/2003/10/05/sore_issue3or_some_physicians/. An orthopedic surgeon who 
had introduced state legislation to ban restrictive covenants between physicians 
in Illinois stated that "he's watched dozens of doctors forced to take their 
specialties out of the community just because they wanted to leave one of the 
local clinics. And, he contends, it's the patients who ultimately suffer." Id. 
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One might assume that physician restrictive covenants would 
receive special treatment by the judiciary given the unique problems 
they present. Unfortunately, the vast majority of courts currently 
view the physician-patient relationship as analogous to a simple 
merchant-customer relationship, thus comparing a very complex 
relationship to an overly simplified one. IS These courts do not 
analyze physician restrictive covenants any differently than they 
analyze covenants-not-to-compete between commercial parties. As 
is the case with restrictive covenants between commercial parties, 
the courts apply a "rule of reason" test to determine whether 
physician restrictive covenants are enforceable.16 Under the rule of 
reason test, a restrictive covenant is reasonable, and therefore 
enforceable, if it 1) is no broader than necessary to protect a 
legitimate interest of the employer, 2) does not unduly burden the 
employee, and 3) does not harm the public. I? The rule of reason test 
historically offers little hope of success to physicians seeking to 
avoid enforcement of restrictive covenants. IS Applying the rule of 
15. A few states have independently banned such agreements. See Berg, 
supra note 6, at 10-14. Although eight states have invalidated noncompetition 
agreements between physicians, only Colorado, Delaware, and Massachusetts 
specifically prohibit such agreements by statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-
113(3) (2004) (prohibiting restrictive covenants but permitting damage awards 
on the termination of a physician employment agreement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
6, § 2707 (2005); MAss. ANN. LAwS. ch. 112 § 12X (LexisNexis 2004). Though 
the Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, and North Dakota 
antitrust statutes do not specifically address physician restrictive covenants, 
they prohibit the use of noncompetition agreements among professionals 
including physicians. Berg, supra note 6, at 12. See generally Michael G. Getty, 
Enforceability of Non-Competition Covenants in Physician Employment 
Contracts: Confusion in the Courts, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 235 (1986) (discussing the 
evolution, effects, and inconsistent judicial enforcement of and proposing an 
alternative system to noncompetition agreements in physician employment 
contracts). 
16. See, e.g., Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84,96-97 (Kan. 1996) (enforcing a 
noncom petition agreement among physicians as a reasonable contractual 
agreement); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1169-70 (N.J. 1978) (applying a 
reasonability test to a noncompetition agreement among dermatologists); 
Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 26-27, 373 
S.E.2d 449, 452 (1988), affd, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E. 2d 750 (1989); Holzer 
Clinic, Inc. v. Simpson, No. 97CA9, 1998 WL 241887, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 28, 1998) (applying a reasonability test to a noncom petition agreement 
between a physician and former employer). 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
18. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 419-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002); Wash. County Mem'l Hosp. v. Sidebottom, 7 S.W.3d 542, 545-46 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999); Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 175, 177-78,35 S.E. 586, 587-88 (1900) 
(upholding a physician restrictive covenant without acknowledging the parties' 
occupations as physicians as relevant to validity of noncompete agreement). 
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reason test, courts have only rarely invalidated physician restrictive 
covenants solely out of concern for the public welfare. 19 This 
approach does not respect the unique role a physician can play in 
the community. Some factors courts havedownplayed or ignored are 
the physician's ability to provide optimal care and the patients' 
ability to choose their physician freely. Surprisingly, nearly 
identical considerations20 have been applied by most courts to limit, 
or completely bar, the enforceability of attorney restrictive 
covenants.21 This strangely disparate treatment of two professional 
groups exists despite the fact that the physician-patient relationship 
is at least as important from a public policy standpoint as that of 
attorney and client. 22 The rule of reason test, as currently applied 
19. Several courts have summarily dismissed the argument that 
noncompetition agreements between physicians are against public policy. See, 
e.g., Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons, Ltd., v. Peairs, 790 P.2d 752, 758 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1989); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n., 449 N.E.2d 276,280-81 (Ind. 
1983). 
20. See, e.g., Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 369 (Ill. 1998) 
(finding that the bar on noncom petition agreements among lawyers "is designed 
both to afford clients greater freedom in choosing counsel and to protect lawyers 
from onerous conditions that would unduly limit their mobility"); see also Jacob 
v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J. 1992) (stating that the 
ethical bar is "designed to serve the public interest in maximum access to 
lawyers"); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,413 (N.Y. 1989) ("While 
a law firm has a legitimate interest in its own survival and economic well-being 
and in maintaining its clients, it cannot protect those interests by ... restricting 
the choices of the clients to retain and continue the withdrawing member as 
counsel. "). 
21. Although most courts do not explicitly describe their analysis as the 
application of a per se rule, that characterization has been used by a number of 
commentators. See, e.g., Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants-not-to-compete and the 
Legal Profession, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 425 (1985). A well-considered law 
review article that discusses the impact of this approach upon the law firm 
structure is Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm 
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1730-38 (1998). Other law review commentaries 
on lawyer noncompetition agreements are cited in Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of 
Lawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 477 n.235 (1998). 
22. The reasoning behind the ABA's decision to deem restrictive covenants 
unethical in 1960 illuminates the enhanced status that relationships between 
professionals and their clients or, in this case, patients, requires. 
A general covenant restricting an employed lawyer, after leaving the 
employment, from practicing in the community for a stated period, 
appears to the Committee to be an unwarranted restriction on the 
right of a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent 
with our professional status. Accordingly, the Committee is of the 
opinion it would be improper for the employing lawyer to require the 
covenant and likewise for the employed lawyer to agree to it. 
ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961); see also 2 GEOFFREY C. 
HAzARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERING § 47.4 (3d ed. 2001 & 
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by the courts, overemphasizes freedom of contract principles and 
economic harm to physician employers. The courts have failed to 
recognize that physician restrictive covenants are partly at odds 
with professional medical ethics and good medical care. 
This Article advances an argument that courts must modify the 
traditional rule of reason test in future evaluation of physician 
restrictive covenants. Courts must consider the impact that 
enforcement of restrictive covenants will have on the relationships 
between physicians and their patients within the public-interest 
prong of the rule of reason analysis. As part of this public-interest 
calculus, courts must weigh the potential harm to patient choice and 
to the professional and ethical obligations of physicians to their 
patients. These considerations should supplement the traditional 
test's vague public-interest prong with the more discrete concerns of 
the patients of a particular physician.23 
Contemporary courts' application of the rule of reason to 
physician restrictive covenants24 is summarized in Part II of this 
Article. Typically, a court will only refuse to enforce a 
noncom petition agreement when doing so would create a scarcity of 
physicians, thereby causing unjustifiable damage to the public 
welfare. 25 But defining the public interest so narrowly ignores the 
harm to existing patients who, in most instances, suffer when they 
lose the continuity, trust, and understanding offered by their 
original physician. 26 The shortcomings of defining the public 
Supp. 2005). The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics originally opposed 
lawyers' covenants-not-to-compete because they smacked of commercialism. 
ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961); see also Charles E. Cantu 
& Jared Woodfill, V, Upon Leaving a Firm: Tell the Truth or Hide the Ball, 39 
VILL. L. REV. 773, 784 (1994) (noting that in its decision, the ABA Committee 
emphasized that law is a profession rather than a business, and that clients 
must be seen as more than merchandise). 
23. The few courts that have recognized the depth of this prong essentially 
allow it to devour the other prongs of the rule of reason, holding that a violation 
of public policy makes all other prongs moot. See Valley Med. Specialists v. 
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1285-86 (Ariz. 1999) (concluding that restrictive 
covenants between physicians must be "strictly construed" because of the 
weighty public policy considerations). Interestingly, since the public policy 
analysis was almost exclusively general, the court found it necessary to remind 
the reader that it was not voiding all restrictive covenants between doctors per 
se. However, the court only vaguely indicated that any covenants may be legal 
in the future. [d. 
24. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 
21, 28, 373 S.E.2d 449, 453-54 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to enforce a restrictive 
covenant because doing so would create a shortage of gastroenterologists in the 
area), affd, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1989). 
26. See infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text. 
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interest in broad, yet vague, notions-such as "scarcity"-rather 
than recognizing its complex nature, are also addressed in Part II of 
this Article.27 
Part III discusses some solutions to the indiscriminate 
application of the rule of reason to physician restrictive covenants.28 
In Part IV, the author proposes that in future cases, incumbent 
patients should be treated as third-party beneficiaries of restrictive 
covenants, giving them an explicit interest in the balancing of harms 
under the rule of reason test.29 By the end of Part IV, it should be 
clear that once courts address the interests of incumbent patients 
when evaluating physician restrictive covenants, what results is a 
new reasonability analysis that better balances the interests 
affected by enforcement of such covenants.30 This new rule of reason 
will permit enforcement of a competition restraint if it 1) is limited 
to prevent only unfair competition, 2) does not improperly elevate an 
employer's economic interests above the departing physician's 
interests, and 3) does not substantially harm the physician's 
incumbent or potential patient base. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS TO 
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS 
A. The Rule of Reason Generally 
Physician employers commonly include noncom petition 
provisions in physician employment contracts.31 These provisions 
apply in the event a physician leaves his or her employer and act to 
limit a physician's ability to practice medicine within specified 
geographic areas. They further contain nonsolicitation clauses, 
which bar the physician from advising patients to follow the 
physician to his or her new place of employment. Even though these 
provisions are contrary to the ideals of free competition and the 
ability of an individual to choose his or her profession, courts uphold 
these noncompete agreements in most instances, applying the rule 
of reason standard.32 Under the rule of reason, a noncompete 
agreement is enforceable as long as it is reasonable as to time and 
geographic restrictions and its enforcement is not against public 
policy. The rule of reason protects the employee's interests, while 
also protecting the employer's legitimate business interests.33 
27. See infra notes 61-83 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 145-204 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 205-27 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 236-48 and accompanying text. 
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
32. 15 GIESEL, supra note 5, § 80.6. 
33. See id. 
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When applying the rule of reason, courts consider whether (1) 
the employer has a legitimate protectable interest,34 (2) the 
restrictive covenant is reasonably designed to protect that interest, 
(3) enforcement will unduly burden the employee,35 and (4) the 
enforcement will violate public policy.36 The judiciary usually views 
restrictive employment covenants skeptically,37 reasoning that a 
postemployment restraint is difficult to justifY because it may 
impede an employee's ability to earn a livelihood and deprive the 
public of an employee's skills and services but not significantly 
advance an employer's economic interests.3s Each jurisdiction's 
analysis of restrictive covenants is unique. Generally, however, 
courts will first determine whether consideration for the covenant 
34. Enforcement of physician restrictive covenants has been "justified on 
the ground that the employer has a legitimate interest in restraining the 
employee from appropriating valuable trade information and customer 
relationships to which he has had access in the course of his employment." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1981). Although the mere 
threat of competition is not a sufficient interest to justifY enforcement of a 
restraint on competition, see, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he law will not enforce a contract merely to prohibit 
ordinary competition."), courts have recognized that employers have protectable 
interests in retaining patients, see, e.g., Duneland Emergency Physician's Med. 
Group v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963, 966-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no 
legitimate protectable interest in retaining patients since restricted physician 
worked in an emergency room setting); confidential information, see, e.g., 
Dental E., P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) 
(enforcing covenant-not-to-compete because departing dentist had access to 
employer's methods of operation and business techniques as well as to its 
patients' names); training, see, e.g., Oudenhoven v. Nishioka, 190 N.W.2d 920, 
921 (Wis. 1971) (characterizing a typical noncompete between physicians as a 
sacrifice often made by a younger physician in order to receive valuable 
training); and goodwill, see, e.g., Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449 
N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 1983) (holding that the covenant "did nothing more than 
protect the Clinic's goodwill against piracy by a mutinous partner"). 
35. To show a restrictive covenant is unduly burdensome, a physician must 
show the agreement imposes some severe and unique personal hardship. See 
Blake, supra note 4, at 684-86; see also Lewis v. Surgery & Gynecology, Inc., No. 
90AP-300, 1991 WL 35010, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. March 12, 1991) (holding that 
enforcement of a restrictive covenant would impose an undue burden by forcing 
a physician to relocate and remove her developmentally disabled daughter from 
a special school). 
36. For a brief overview of the public interests involved, see Michael R. 
Sullivan, Note, Covenants Not to Compete and Liquidated Damages Clauses: 
Diagnosis and Treatment for Physicians, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 505, 514 (1995) (citing 
Andrea Cooper, Law and Medicine: Restrictive Covenants, 248 J. AM. MED. 
AsS'N 3091 (1982». 
37. See Blake, supra note 4, at 647. 
38. See id. 
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exists.39 If the employee received adequate consideration for signing 
the covenant, judges will proceed to examine separately the 
interests of the employer, the employee, and the public in order to 
determine whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable under the 
circumstances.4o Generally, a restrictive covenant is unreasonable if 
1) it is broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate 
interests,41 or 2) the employer's interests are outweighed by the 
interests of either the employee or the public.42 Courts have applied 
this "rule of reason" test to noncom petition agreements signed by 
accountants,43 doctors,44 veterinarians,45 as well as other 
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
40. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.3, at 356 (2d ed. 1990). 
41. If an employer does have a protectable interest, the court will proceed 
to consider whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable as to its duration, 
geographical area, and type of medical practice restricted. See Valley Med. 
Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1284 (Ariz. 1999) ("The idea is to give the 
employer a reasonable amount of time to overcome the former employee's loss, 
usually by hiring a replacement and giving that replacement time to establish a 
working relationship."); see also Berg, supra note 6, at 23-27; Blake, supra note 
4, at 676-81; Mark A. Glick et aI., The Law and Economics of Post-Employment 
Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO MAsON L. REV. 357, 371-72 (2002) 
(providing a general overview of technicalities of the modern rule of reason 
test). The average mileage restriction for restrictive covenants that are 
enforced is 33.9 miles. Empirical Study, A Statistical Analysis of 
Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15. J. CORP. L. 483, 511 
(1990); see, e.g., Northside Hosp., Inc. v. McCord, 537 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2000); see also Zulima V. Farber et aI., Are Physician Post-Employment 
Noncompete Agreements Enforceable?, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, March 2004, at 4 
(discussing the varying enforceable distances in various states' physician 
restrictive covenants). 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(b) (1981); see, e.g., Mantek 
Div. of NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that a provision prohibiting salesmen from selling a competing product in their 
former territories is unnecessary to protect an employer's interest because only 
a prohibition on calling customers with whom the employee came into contact 
during employment is reasonable); Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum 
Components, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1201, 1210 (D.N.H. 1992) (holding that a 
covenant-not-to-compete that prohibited employees from working for competing 
magnetic fluid manufacturer for five years is an undue burden on employees), 
affd, 968 F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992). 
43. See, e.g., Fuller v. Brough, 411 P.2d 18, 22 (Colo. 1966) (upholding as 
reasonable a restrictive covenant prohibiting a withdrawing accountant from 
practicing within forty-five miles of city for five years); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co. v. Sharp, 585 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (declaring that a 
restrictive covenant agreed to by an accountant was unreasonable because the 
clause failed to designate a specific geographic area). 
44. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 810 (Ala. 1968) (holding 
unreasonable and unenforceable a restrictive covenant prohibiting a specialist 
from practicing in area where shortage of specialists existed); Gelder Med. 
Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding a reasonable 
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professionals.46 The rule of reason test is the "dominant judicial 
approach to enforceability.,,47 
B. Current Application of the Rule of Reason to Physician 
Restrictive Covenants: A One-Dimensional View of the Doctor-
Patient Relationship 
1. Economics Over Patients: Prioritizing the Employer's 
Interests 
Physician employers argue that they are entitled to the 
enforcement of covenants-not-to-compete based upon protectable 
interests in their customer base, confidential information, training, 
and customer goodwill. 48 Of these, physician employers most often 
assert a protectable interest in keeping existing patients after an 
employee's departure.49 The physician employer fears that patients 
who have been treated continually by a specific physician will wish 
to maintain the relationship with that physician even after the 
physician resigns from practice with the physician employer. 50 
covenant restricting a physician's right to practice within thirty miles of former 
partnership based on lack of injury to the public). 
45. See, e.g., Cukjati v. Burkett, 772 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. App. 1989) 
(invalidating as unreasonable a covenant-not-to-compete in veterinarian's 
employment contract which prohibited him from practicing veterinary medicine 
within twelve miles of his employer's clinic); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 
Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 544-45 (Wyo. 1993) (upholding covenant restricting 
competition by declaring that restricting veterinarian from practicing on small 
animals within five-mile radius of city limits was reasonable, but that a three-
year limit was unreasonable). 
46. See, e.g., Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 132-33 (Wyo. 1947) (declaring 
unreasonable and unenforceable an agreement restricting mechanic from 
working for seven years in specific cities and counties); Keller v. Cal. Liquid Gas 
Corp., 363 F. Supp. 123, 125-28 (D. Wyo. 1973) (analyzing a noncompete 
agreement between a buyer and seller of a liquid gas business). See generally 
14 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF 
CONTRACTS § 1636 (3d ed. 1972). 
47. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information 
Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing 
Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2001). 
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1981); see, e.g., 
Folsom Funeral Servo v. Rodgers, 372 N.E.2d 532, 533 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) 
(declaring a restrictive covenant unreasonable because customer relationships 
and contacts did not have a great impact on the undertaking business); 
Purchasing Assocs., Inc. V. Weitz, 196 N.E. 2d 245, 248 (N.Y. 1963) (reversing 
the lower court's judgment in favor of a restrictive covenant after discovering no 
loss of trade secrets, customers, and unique and extraordinary services). 
49. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414,421 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) ("[Mledical practices have a 'protectible interest in the patients of their 
physicians and this interest is inferred from the nature of the profession."). 
50. See id. at 422. 
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Courts generally accept this reasoning by treating patients as 
assets of the physician employer that could be unfairly appropriated 
by the physician, thus warranting protection by a covenant-not-to-
compete.51 Such an approach subordinates the personal relationship 
of the doctor-patient to the economic relationship between a patient-
customer and a clinic, office, or practice group. Consider, as an 
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Granger v. 
Craven.52 
In that case, followed by a majority of courts,53 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court upheld a physician restrictive covenant because, 
according to the court's reasoning, it did no more than necessary to 
protect a practice group against a departing physician's ''hold" on his 
patients.54 The Granger court set the tone for later courts that 
continued to view patients merely as customers, rather than 
individuals whose unique relationships with their physicians would 
normally distinguish them from otherwise indiscriminate 
commercial clients.55 
Courts have even gone as far as to enforce physician restrictive 
covenants despite recognition that such covenants would be enforced 
to the detriment of the physician's patients.56 In Dickinson Medical 
51. See Blake, supra note 4, at 662 ("Restraints upon professional 
employees, such as associates or technical assistants of lawyers, doctors, 
architects, accountants, and dentists, are also generally upheld when the 
customer relationships are substantial."). But see Mandeville v. Harman, 7 A. 
37,40-41 (N.J. Ch. 1886) (holding that protection of a medical practice's patient 
base was not a sufficient interest to warrant judicial enforcement of a covenant-
not-to-compete). 
52. 199 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1924). 
53. See Berg, supra note 6, at 17. 
54. See Granger, 199 N.W. at 13-14. 
55. See, e.g., Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., P.C., 510 S.E.2d 
880, 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a noncompetition agreement among 
cardiovascular surgeons that barred the employee from any competing 
cardiovascular surgery practice within seventy-five miles of the former 
employer for a two-year period after termination to protect the former 
employer's "legitimate business interests" in maintaining its "substantial 
patient base and network of referring physicians throughout the protected 
territory"). 
56. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) ("Despite our sympathy for the rights of patients to choose their own 
doctors, we are constrained to follow the long line of precedent finding 
noncom petition agreements enforceable in the medical profession." (internal 
citations omitted»; Bloomington Urological Assocs., S.C. v. Scaglia, 686 N.E.2d 
389, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (declaring a noncompete agreement between 
physicians enforceable but acknowledging the sacrosanct relationship between 
the contracting physician and his patients); see also Willman v. Beheler, 499 
S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (holding a covenant-not-to-compete valid even 
though a shortage of surgeons existed in the area because such shortages 
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Group v. Foote,57 a hospital's only board-certified staff oncologist 
resigned and left with a computer print-out of the names and 
addresses of all the cancer patients she had treated with 
chemotherapy. 58 Although Dr. Foote's employment contract barred 
her from treating former patients, Dr. Foote argued that she had a 
professional and ethical responsibility to contact her former patients 
to offer continuity of treatment. 59 Though the Delaware court 
sympathized with the plight of her patients, it determined the 
patient list was a protectable trade secret wrongfully appropriated 
by Dr. Foote and consequently enforced the restrictive covenant.60 
2. Public Interest as a Numbers Game: "Patients are not . .. 
property or chattel. ,,61 
The public interest, or public policy, element of the rule of 
reason test has been a magic wand of sorts for courts to use as they 
please in upholding or striking down restrictive covenants between 
physicians. Unfortunately, the vast majority of contemporary 
evaluations of the public interest prong focus almost exclusively on 
the interest of the public at large,62 rather than also considering the 
interests of individual patients.63 Courts upholding covenants 
between doctors either ignore this prong altogether64 or interpret it 
existed in many areas). 
57. No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1984). 
58. See id. 
59. [d. at *2. For further discussion of some of the ethical issues raised by 
physician restrictive covenants, see Derek W. Loeser, supra note 9, at 286-87. 
60. Chancellor Brown noted: 
[The issue of the case] lacks the ring of humanitarianism that 
once was associated with the practice of medicine. Prior to this 
application, I never had reason to equate a list of persons 
suffering from cancer and other illnesses with a proprietary 
'customer list' as that term is normally employed in the world 
of commerce. But I guess business is business, regardless of 
the form it takes. 
Dickinson, 1984 WL 8208 at *2. 
61. Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Jacobson, 614 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.1992). 
62. See Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 93-95 (Kan. 1996) (discussing the 
public interest in the ability to access physician care). Courts often simply 
calculate the numbers of certain specialists needed in the pertinent 
geographical area without any inquiry into the quality of the care or the 
interests of individual patients. 
63. See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assoc., 320 S.E.2d 170, 173 (Ga. 
1984) (viewing the harm to the public of upholding the restrictive covenant as 
mitigated by treating one community's loss of a doctor as another community's 
gain); Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (noting that most 
communities are short of medical doctors). 
64. See Rash, 320 S.E.2d at 173-74 (dismissing the public policy prong as 
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to require only a certain number of physicians or specialists in a 
certain geographic area.65 Those courts that strike down covenants 
between physicians often use the public interest prong to 
overshadow and render moot the other elements of the rule of 
reason test.66 These small minority of latter courts have, to a 
varying degree, identified and explored the "public interest" in 
relation to the doctor-patient relationship, often viewing the issue as 
much more complex than simply a game of dueling statistics.67 
In many of the most recent cases over disputed physician 
restrictive covenants, the courts have not found the potential harm 
to the public to be substantial enough to rescind the covenants.68 
The lack of attention given by the Kansas Supreme Court in Weber 
v. Tillman 69 to the impact enforcement would have on the public 
essentially irrelevant since a doctor in one city is as useful as a doctor in 
another). 
65. See Rash, 320 S.E.2d at 173-74; Marshall v. Covington, 339 P.2d 504, 
506-07 (Idaho 1959) (citing Bauer v. Sawyer, infra, for the same proposition); 
Bauer v. Sawyer, 126 N.E.2d 844, 851 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (finding no evidence 
that enforcement would create a shortage of doctors in the restriction area and, 
thus, finding no public harm); Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678, 682 
(Iowa 1962) (finding that a sufficient number of doctors remained available to 
the community to avoid public harm from enforcement). But see Duffner v. 
Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (striking down a 
restrictive covenant on a finding that the agreement "constitutes an undue 
interference with the interests of the public right of availability of the 
orthopedic surgeon it prefers to use and that the covenant's enforcement would 
result in an unreasonable restraint of trade"). Even if enforcement would 
create a shortage of doctors within the restriction area, the resulting harm still 
may not always be deemed sufficient to justify denying enforcement. See, e.g., 
Weber, 913 P.2d at 96 (enforcing a restriction). The Weber court noted that each 
of the cases it cited for having held a restriction unenforceable because of the 
potential shortage of physicians dealt with "a shortage of physicians [in] 
specialties which were, for lack of a better term, medically necessary." Id. at 95 
(internal citations omitted). 
66. See infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text. 
67. See id. 
68. See, e.g., Willman, 499 S.W.2d at 777 (enforcing a restrictive covenant 
despite evidence of shortage of surgeons in the northwest part of the state); 
Gant v. Hygeia Facilities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 842, 846 n.7 (W. Va. 1989) 
(enforcing a restrictive covenant that required a covenantor to leave a rural 
area despite evidence of a statewide shortage of rural doctors). 
69. 913 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1996). The restrictive covenant barred the doctor's 
practice of dermatology within a thirty-mile radius of his former practice for a 
period of two years. If he chose to violate the covenant, he was required to pay 
six-months salary plus bonuses to Dr. Weber. Id. at 87. Forty to fifty percent of 
the departing doctor's patients had been patients of the former practice. The 
competition restriction, however, barred all practice in the designated 
geographic area and was not limited to only the treatment of former patients of 
the employer. See id. at 92. 
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welfare is typical. Dr. Weber, the only dermatologist in northwest 
and north central Kansas, hired Dr. Tillman on the condition that 
he would not practice dermatology within thirty miles of Dr. Weber's 
office for a period of two years following termination. 70 The court 
upheld the noncompetition clause,71 finding the covenant was not 
against public policy72 despite expert testimony that the 
community's dermatological needs would be jeopardized if Dr. 
Tillman was banned from practicing in the restricted area. 73 
The court seemed relatively unconcerned by this danger,74 
especially because of the possibility Dr. Tillman might "buyout" the 
restriction. "[A]s a practical matter, the people [of the area] ... may 
not lose Dr. Tillman's services as a dermatologist," the court 
observed. 75 "[T]heir welfare is not injured if they have to travel 
further to obtain dermatology services should Dr. Tillman elect not 
[to buyout the restriction]," the court stated.76 Because the lack of 
any "substantial public injury" to potential patients compared 
unfavorably to Dr. Weber's "investment of years, education, and 
effort in establishing his practice and the value of goodwill 
developed over 17 years,,,77 the court held the covenant's scope 
protected Dr. Weber from any competitive advantage Dr. Tillman 
might derive from his former employer's goodwill. 78 
70. ld. at 87. To stay in practice, Dr. Tillman was required to pay 
liquidated damages totaling more than $82,000. ld. at 88. 
71. The Weber court noted that it had previously found a ten-year 
noncompetition clause between two physicians to be reasonable in time 
although it reduced the geographic scope from one-hundred miles to five miles. 
See id. at 90 (discussing Foltz v. Struxness, 215 P.2d 133, 133 (Kan. 1950». 
72. See id. at 96. But see also, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-
14 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a noncompetition agreement invalid as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade). The Duffner court invalidated the covenant 
because it prohibited only ordinary competition and declared that the 
physicians had no valid economic interest to protect because: 
[There were nol trade secrets, formulas, methods, or devices 
which gave appellant an advantage. . .. At the time he joined 
the association he had received his training and skills elsewhere 
and brought them with him. There is nothing. . . to indicate 
that he learned any trade secret or surgical procedures ... which 
were not readily available to other[sl. 
ld. at 114. 
73. See Weber, 913 P.2d at 93. Dr. Weber himself admitted that the 
community could support two or more dermatologists. ld. For a further 
discussion of liquidated damages clauses, see infra notes 168-72 and 
accompanying text. 
74. See Weber, 913 P.2d at 93-95. 
75. ld. at 96. 
76. ld. 
77. ld. at 92, 96. 
78. ld. at 95. Note the difficulty Dr. Weber had in locating a physician to 
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Even when courts recognize how a scarcity of physicians will 
affect the public interest, they sometimes attempt to mitigate its 
significance by suggesting that though one community may lose a 
physician, another must necessarily gain one. This analysis, 
however, not only ignores the intimate nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship, but improperly shifts the focus from the affected 
community to an unrelated community.79 For example, in Gillespie 
u. Carbondale & Marion Eye Centers, Ltd.,sO an Illinois appellate 
court enforced a restrictive covenant against a physician even 
though statistics presented during trial indicated that doing so could 
have caused a shortage of eye specialists in the community and 
could have left hospitals "unable to provide adequate medical care at 
a reasonable cost."Sl The court reasoned that because the doctor was 
prohibited from practicing in one area, any public harm would be 
mitigated by his provision of those same medical services in another 
community.s2 The interests of the patients in the restricted area 
were completely ignored.s3 Indeed, the notion that the benefit of 
come to the area initially. Evidence showed that the departing physician-
employee "had no connection to the community prior to his employment, and he 
brought with him no patients . . .. [Hel acknowledged that he benefited by 
beginning his career in an established practice rather than starting his own." 
Id. at 92; see also Canfield v. Spear, 254 N.E.2d 433, 434 (Ill. 1969) (placing 
importance upon the fact that a departing doctor had been "a newcomer to the 
community, and it was doubtless through the opportunities provided by this 
association [with the employerl that he became known in the city"). But see 
Damsey v. Mankowitz, 339 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding a 
noncompetition agreement unreasonable when there was a shortage of 
physicians in the area). 
79. See, e.g., Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770,777 (Mo. 1973) (rejecting 
the public harm argument and explaining that, while enforcement of the 
restrictive covenant would lead to a shortage of health care providers in the 
restricted area, it would result in an increase in health care providers in the 
area in which the departing physician established a new practice). The 
Willman court also upheld the provision because of "a counterbalancing public 
policy ... in enforcing contractual rights and obligations." Id. Thus, any harm 
to the public within the covenant area would be offset by a benefit to those who 
reside within the departing physician's new service area. Id. 
80. 622 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
81. Id. at 1269. 
82. Id. at 1270. 
83. Likewise, the Georgia court in Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical 
Associates, 320 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1984), considered the interests of potential 
medical patients only briefly and reached a similar conclusion. Recognizing 
that the enforcement of this restriction might "limit the right of potential 
patients" in a certain area "to avail themselves" of the doctor's services, the 
court found the point to be unpersuasive. Id. at 173. 
[Ilt can be argued with at least equal conviction that this would afford 
countless other people in other areas, both in and outside of the state, 
the opportunity to have a physician in their areas. There is no reason 
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adding a new doctor to a to-be-announced location equals the cost to 
incumbent patients caused by losing their doctor is ridiculous. The 
incumbent patients suffer in the short term a great deal more than 
the potential new patients gain. Also, the analysis depends on how 
many specialists are in a market. If the city of Washington, D.C. 
has two thousand dermatologists, losing one does not impede patient 
choice. If Lexington, Virginia, however, has only two 
dermatologists, losing one of the two dermatologists to a noncompete 
clause is a big deal. 
C. Issues Ignored in the Current Analysis of Physician Restrictive 
Covenants 
1. Continuity of Care 
The current application of the rule of reason to physician 
restrictive covenants is contrary to many well-respected medical 
studies showing that continuity of care in the doctor-patient 
relationship fosters greater quality of health care.54 It is also 
contrary to research that indicates that the involuntary termination 
of this relationship may have long-term negative effects on 
patients.85 
A patient's ability to build a lasting relationship with the 
physician of his or her choice is an important aspect of healthcare. 
Continuity of care is a term of art used within the medical 
community to mean health care that is given by a single physician 
over some period of time and that includes an evolving relationship 
between the physician and patient.86 Research indicates that the 
benefits of continuity of care stem from a patient's repeated visits to 
the same physician, as opposed to a patient's repeated visits to the 
same clinic or office.87 One study shows that it takes a few to several 
to conclude... that the need for the appellant's services, in the 
context of this case, is sufficient to outweigh the law's interest in 
upholding and protecting freedom to contract and to enforce 
contractual rights and obligations. 
Id. at 173-74; see also Canfield, 254 N.E.2d at 435 (holding that a doctor "can be 
as useful to the public at some other place in the State" as he can be in the place 
where the non-competitor agreement is effective because "the health of persons 
elsewhere is just as important"). 
84. Margaret M. Love et aI., Continuity of Care and the Physician·Patient 
Relationship, 49 J. FAM. PRAC. 998, 1002 (2000). 
85. Tim Stokes et aI., Ending the Doctor-Patient Relationship in General 
Practice: A Proposed Model, 21 FAM. PRAC. 507, 513 (2004). 
86. See Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, Continuity of Care, Definition of, 
http://www.aafp.org/x6694.xml (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
87. See Arch G. Mainous III & James M. Gill, The Importance of Continuity 
of Care in the Likelihood of Future Hospitalization: Is Site of Care Equivalent to 
a Primary Clinician?, 88 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1539, 1539-40 (1998) (finding 
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visits for a patient to even feel comfortable with a new physician, 
while it may take several years before a patient feels the physician 
knows him or her well.88 Continuity of care has been linked to 
improved patient satisfaction,89 and patients who are more satisfied 
with their physician are more compliant with suggested treatment 
regimens.90 For instance, patients with Type 2 Diabetes who have 
greater continuity of care with a primary care provider experience 
better glucose control, a product of the patient following the 
physician's recommended diet changes.91 Continuity of care has 
been further linked to increased utilization of preventative services, 
within the Delaware Medicaid Program that greater continuity of care with a 
physician decreases the likelihood of subsequent hospital visits and further 
noting that it is the physician-patient relationship that is relevant, not 
necessarily the relationship a patient has with a specific clinic). 
88. See Keith Sinusas, Patients' Attitudes Toward the Closing of a Medical 
Practice, 28 J. FAM. PRAc. 561, 561-63 (1989) (reporting the results of a survey 
of two hundred patients after their family physician closed his practice and 
finding that in a majority of cases it took the physician longer to understand 
emotional problems than physical ones). The study revealed that one half of 
patients needed a few visits to become comfortable with a new physician, one 
third needed several visits to be comfortable, and a small number of people 
needed a few years to become comfortable. Id. at 561-62. Most of the 
respondents said that it took two to five years for a physician to know their 
medical problems well and over five years to believe that their emotional 
problems were very well known to the physician. Id. at 563. 
89. See Love et aI., supra note 84, at 998, 1002 (analyzing adult Kentucky 
Medicaid recipients and finding that continuity of care was an important 
predictor of provider communication and patient influence). The study also 
found that for patients with asthma, a chronic illness, continuity of care was the 
only variable that predicted patient perceptions of physician-patient 
communication. This seems to show that there is a special relationship that 
exists between patients with chronic illnesses and their physicians and that 
continuity of care may be even more important to them than to people who have 
acute illnesses. Id. at 1002-03. 
90. See Marjorie A. Bowman, Good Physician-Patient Relationship :: 
Improved Patient Outcome?, 32 J. FAM. !>RAc. 135, 136 (1991) (citing Francis J. 
Martin & Martin J. Bass, The Impact of Discussion of Non-Medical Problems in 
the Physician's Office, 6 FAM. PRAC. 254, 255-56 (1989) (discussing a study in 
which patients who believed that the "[d]octor tells me all I want to know about 
my illness" and the "[d]octor gives me a chance to say what is really on my 
mind" had higher rates of compliance with physician's ordered treatments)). 
91. See Abstracts, 287 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 2475 (2002) (reporting a study by 
Michael L. Parchman et aI., Continuity of Care, Self-management Behaviors, 
and Glucose Control in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes, that analyzed a random 
sample of adults who had been diagnosed with Type 2 Diabetes and found that 
patients who advanced one or more stages in their change of diet regimen had 
higher levels of continuity with their physicians than did patients who had not 
advanced). 
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such as breast and cervical cancer screening in adult women92 and 
vaccination in children.93 Hospitalizations are less likely for 
patients who experience. continuity of care.94 Studies in both the 
pediatric and adult populations have shown that greater continuity 
of care tends to decrease emergency-department use.95 Continuity of 
care also has been linked to lower health care costs in older 
Americans.96 Long-term continuity of care is difficult to achieve, 
however, when a patient must see a different physician frequently 
and cannot build a trusting relationship with a physician.97 
92. See Ann S. O'Malley et aI., Continuity of Care and the Use of Breast and 
Cervical Cancer Screening Services in a Multiethnic Community, 157 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1462, 1462, 1467 (1997) (reporting the existence of a "linear 
trend" in the increase of nonmammogram breast and cervical cancer screening 
rates, that rates of cancer screenings were higher in women with a usual source 
of care than women who did not, and that rates of screenings were even higher 
in women who had a regular clinician at the usual source of care). 
93. See Dimitri A. Christakis et aI., The Association Between Greater 
Continuity of Care and Timely Measles-Mumps-Rubella Vaccination, 90 AM. J. 
PuB. HEALTH 962, 963-64 (2000) (finding that patients who were enrolled in 
Group Health Cooperative from birth to fifteen months with high and medium 
continuity with their physicians were more likely to be immunized by fifteen 
months than those who had low continuity with the physician). 
94. See Mainous & Gill, supra note 87, at 1539-40 (finding that Delaware 
Medicaid patients with greater continuity of care with a physician decreases the 
likelihood of subsequent hospital visits). 
95. See Dimitri A. Christakis et aI., Is Greater Continuity of Care 
Associated With Less Emergency Department Utilization?, 103 PEDIATRICS 738, 
739-41 (1999) (finding that children with high levels of continuity of care 
experienced less emergency-department visits than children with low levels). 
The study also found that attending doctor continuity mattered more than 
resident doctor continuity in predicting emergency-department visits among 
children. Christakis posited that this may be because attending physicians 
interact with the patients over a longer span of time and have a greater 
knowledge of patients, whereas residents only work one half day per week and 
are temporary. Id. at 740; see also Abstracts, 284 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 548 (2000) 
(reporting a study of Medicaid clients by James M. Gill et aI., The Effect of 
Continuity of Care on Emergency Department Use, which found that patients 
with greater continuity of care were less likely to visit the emergency room a 
single time and that high continuity of care was even more strongly associated 
with a lower likelihood of visiting the emergency department more than once). 
96. See Linda J. Weiss & Jan Blustein, Faithful Patients: The Effect of 
Long-Term Physician-Patient Relationships on the Costs and Use of Health Care 
by Older Americans, 86 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1742, 1743, 1745 (1996) (studying 
Americans who were sixty-five or older, who participated in the Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey in 1991, and who had a usual source of care, and 
finding that patients who had continuous relationships with a physician for ten 
years or more spent $495.61 less for Medicare Part A benefit reimbursements 
and $316.78 less for Part B reimbursement costs than patients who had a 
relationship with their physician that had gone on for one year or less). 
97. See Walter W. Rosser & Jan Kasperski, The Benefits of a Trusting 
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In sum, medical research on continuity and discontinuity in 
provider care has established that the involuntary loss of a 
physician is a significant physical and psychological hardship that 
may be experienced by the patient for an extended period.98 The 
rules applying to restrictive covenants and their proper 
interpretation should serve to encourage provider continuity in 
health care, not undermine it. 
2. The Physician's Ethical Duties 
While forced discontinuity of care may have detrimental effects 
for the patient when it occurs because of a restrictive covenant, 99 it 
is equally troublesome for the physician. The American Medical 
Association ("AMA") Official Guidelines state that once a physician-
patient relationship is formed, the physician has a legal and ethical 
duty to continue providing care as long as the patient needs it. lOa 
When a physician must terminate the patient relationship due to a 
restrictive covenant, she must simultaneously fulfill this ethical 
obligation. Doing so requires that the physician give the patient 
reasonable notice of termination, as well as sufficient opportunity to 
find an alternative provider. 101 The AMA provides steps that a 
physician should follow in terminating the relationship, including 
providing the patient with a reason for terminating the relationship, 
continuing to provide treatment while the patient attempts to locate 
Physician·Patient Relationship, 50 J. FAM. PRAc. 329, 329-30 (2001). The study 
found that certain behaviors of physicians are associated with enhanced trust of 
patients, including comforting and caring, demonstrating competency, 
encouraging and asking questions, and explaining medical issues. Further, the 
factors that influence trust in a negative manner include system intrusions on 
the relationship, such as mandating screening tests for all and disallowing the 
ordering of specific tests. The study also found that patients trusted physicians 
salaried on a fee-for-service basis more than they trusted physicians salaried by 
HMOs. [d. 
98. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text. 
99. See Berg, supra note 6, at 31-36 (discussing in detail the harm to the 
physician-patient relationship, particularly to those patients who are 
hospitalized, that results from the enforcement of physician restrictive 
covenants). 
100. See AMA, Ending the Patient-Physician Relationship (Mar. 7, 2005), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4609.html. 
101. See, e.g., Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225,229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
(upholding the rule that physicians may terminate the patient-physician 
relationship as long as they give notice to the patient and the patient has 
sufficient opportunity to secure care from another physician); Ricks v. Budge, 64 
P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (holding that the failure to satisfy the duty to 
notify the patient when the physician terminates the relationship can result in 
abandonment liability if the patient suffers an injury as a result of the 
termination). 
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a new provider, recommending a new provider at the patient's 
request, and transferring the patient's files to another physician 
only with the patient's permission. 102 Many physicians are 
prohibited from contacting their former patients under restrictive 
covenants and are therefore unable to fulfill these legal and ethical 
bl ' t' 103 olga Ions. 
The physician-patient relationship is unlike most other business 
relationships. When a physician must terminate his or her 
relationship with a patient because of a restrictive covenant, the 
patient may suffer the consequences physically. In most other 
cases, the customer who is denied the service of the professional 
under a noncompetition clause is harmed only financially. Because 
physicians have an ethical duty to put the welfare of their patients 
above their own, a noncompetition clause undermines those ethics 
when it places the employers' financial interests above patients' 
interests. 104 Thus, physician restrictive covenants should be viewed 
in a very different manner from covenants existing in other business 
relationships. The potential harm to the patient should playa more 
active role in determining whether or not to enforce a restrictive 
covenant. 
3. The Realities of Modern Medicine 
Courts often do not declare physician restrictive covenants 
injurious to the public because patients can still see the physician of 
their choice-albeit at a location that may be undesirable. 105 In 
some cases, this is highly impractical. The average geographic scope 
for restrictive covenants that are enforced is 33.9 miles. lOS This can 
be a great distance to be forced to drive to see one's physician of 
choice, especially if a patient is ill and in urgent need of a doctor. 
Moreover, the geographic scope fails to account for the quality of the 
102. See AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 8.11, 8.115 (1996); AMA, supra 
note 100; see also Sleweon v. Burke, Murphy, Constanza & Cuppy, 712 N.E.2d 
517, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing a physician who sued his attorneys in 
part for mismanagement of his patients' files after he breached a covenant-not-
to-compete). 
103. See, e.g., Jeff Sturgeon, Prevented from Practicing, ROANOKE TIMES, 
Mar. 18,2001, at 1; see also Bloomington Urological Assocs., S.C. v. Scaglia, 686 
N.E.2d 389, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (upholding a covenant-not-to-compete 
between physicians but reversing contempt conviction of doctor who tried to 
contact a former patient to inquire about his condition under AMA Code § 8.11). 
104. See Loeser, supra note 9, at 287. 
105. See Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., P.C., 510 S.E.2d 880, 885 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding covenant-not-to-compete as reasonable because 
the plaintiff "attracted patients and referrals from throughout the designated 
area"). 
106. See Empirical Study, supra note 41, at 51l. 
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hospital outside the covenant area or for patients who are generally 
immobile, have no access to vehicular transportation, or do not have 
the financial resources to travel so far to visit their physician. 
Further, the current rule of reason analysis of physician 
restrictive covenants also fails to address the fundamental role that 
Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO")IHMO payment schemes 
now play in the United States health care system. More is involved 
today with a restrictive covenant than the inconvenience associated 
with the distances patients may have to travel to continue seeing 
their physician. Many managed care networks are highly localized. 
A physician subject to a restrictive covenant may move to a new 
town and receive staff privileges at a new hospital that is fairly close 
to the former patient. For the patient, if the new hospital in the new 
town is not part of the patient's HMO or PPO network, the patient 
may well receive no benefits or, at best, reduced benefits from the 
patient's health insurer. This lack of health insurance coverage may 
mean that even a small change in physician location can deprive the 
patient of the doctor's services. Thus, the evolving structure of 
managed care can exacerbate the effects of restrictive covenants. 107 
In addition, the duration of the covenant may be quite long. 
Courts have routinely upheld covenants lasting up to five years,108 
107. As the health care industry becomes more integrated, physicians 
combine or affiliate with one another to control costs and expand their access to 
patients through managed care plans. This process is reflected in the dramatic 
growth of HMOs, entities which combine health care delivery and financing in 
one prepaid capitative benefit plan. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 3, § 9-10. 
Additionally, 
the number of Americans in HMOs rose rapidly from fifteen million in 
1984 to more than fifty million in 1996. . . . In 1983, about four 
percent of private-sector employees belonged to an HMO. By 2000, 
ninety-two percent of workers at companies with ten or more 
employees were in managed care. 
William G. Kopit, Price Competition in Hospital Markets: The Significance of 
Managed Care, 35 J. HEALTH L. 291, 297-98 (2002) (footnote omitted). However, 
the amount of workers covered by "more restrictive HMOs has remained stable 
since 1998," and the amount covered by "preferred provider organizations has 
grown from [thirty-five] percent in 1998 to [forty-one] percent in 2000," and 
American society has seen somewhat of a backlash against managed care. Id. 
(footnote omitted). The integration of health care delivery creates new 
contractual concerns for physicians. To effectively compete for patients, 
physicians join HMOs or form their own associations. In today's medical 
marketplace, physicians are more likely than ever to be employees, rather than 
owners or partners. See David J. Schiller, What You Should Bargain for in a 
Restrictive Covenant, MED. ECON., July 11, 1994, at 51, 5l. 
108. See Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assocs., 320 S.E.2d 170, 171 (Ga. 1984) 
(three years); Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (two 
years); Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) 
(two years); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 87 (Kan. 1996) (two years). 
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explaining that this duration provides employers with a reasonable 
period of time to hire new doctors and gives those doctors sufficient 
time to demonstrate their competence to patients. 109 
4. Physician Immobility 
When considering the reasonableness of the physician 
restrictive covenant, courts fail to recognize that most physicians 
are relatively immobile in terms of state licensing and practice 
area. uo A physician must be licensed to practice in each state in 
which he or she desires to practice;1l1 no national physician licensing 
system currently exists. u2 Thus, a physician forced to move out of 
one state must pay for and pass the licensing examination in the 
new state in order to practice his craft. Accordingly, the power to 
terminate a physician and leave him subject to a restrictive 
covenant is a significant power in the hands ofthe employer. u3 
Courts often opine that physicians are not restricted from 
109. See Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990) 
("Reasonableness [of duration requirements) depends upon the period of time 
required to obliterate in the minds of the . . . customers the identification 
formed during the period of the ... employment." (quoting Fields Found., Ltd. v. 
Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1981»). Courts will not 
uphold covenants of unlimited duration. Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 735 
(Ga. 1898) (striking down a covenant for unlimited duration); House of Vision, 
Inc. v. Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21, 22, 25 (Ill. 1967) (invalidating a covenant lasting 
the life of the contracting physician); Darrow v. Kolczun, No. 90CA004759, 1991 
WL 35120, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Api>. Mar. 6, 1991) (calling a noncompete 
fundamentally flawed for being unlimited in duration). 
110. Physicians must comply with state licensing laws. See FuRROW ET AL., 
supra note 3, § 3-1. Compliance with state regulations and licensing laws is 
both time consuming and costly. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 810 (6th ed. 2003); Kerry A. Kearney, Medical Licensure: An 
Impediment to Interstate Telemedicine, 9 HEALTH LAW (ABA HEALTH LAw 
SECTION), No.4, 1997, at 14, 14. Doctors who violate licensing statutes risk 
numerous sanctions including civil and criminal penalties, disciplinary 
proceedings, Medicare debarment, invalidation of mandatory malpractice 
insurance, and removal from specialty boards. See FURROW ET AL, supra note 3, 
§ 3-11; HALL ET. AL, supra, at 815-16. 
111. See generally FuRROW ET AL, supra note 3, §3-1. 
112. See Susan E. Volkert, Telemedicine: Rx for the Future of Health Care, 6 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147,177-80 (1999-2000) (discussing the need 
for a national licensing system). 
113. See Peter B. Jurgeleit, Note, Physician Employment Under Managed 
Care: Toward a Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated 
Physicians, 73 IND. L.J. 255, 276 & n.110 (1997) (citing Lawrence E. Blades, 
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise 
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967) (arguing that the 
nonunion employee's immobility makes the absolute right of discharge the 
employer's prime source of power over the employee». 
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practicing all medicine, only that which they were practicing for the 
contracted employer.114 A license to practice medicine is a general 
license: the physician can practice any type of medicine he 
chooses.l15 Thus, it is true that a specialist such as a dermatologist 
could stay in a restricted area if he chose to practice general 
medicine instead of dermatology. However, this view ignores the 
reality of the situation. 
Physicians typically train for years to acquire the requisite 
expertise for their chosen specialty (including even the broader 
fields of family practice or internal medicine), and this investment of 
time would, for most physicians, need to be repeated to shift 
practices areas. In addition, the physician is not likely board 
certified for other medical work. 116 Board certification is a step 
above licensing. It means that a physician has been trained and 
supervised in a specialty and has demonstrated competence in an 
examination process.117 To achieve board certification, a physician 
typically must complete a three-to-seven-year residency. During 
this training, the physician must participate in and conduct a 
minimum number of medical procedures. Following the residency 
training, the physician must pass both an oral and written 
examination in a specific area (e.g., internal medicine, family 
practice, or obstetrics and gynecology).118 
The days of the Norman Rockwell era in which the doctor 
treats everyone in the community for every ailment are over. The 
requirement of board certification affects the ability of physicians to 
practice in multiple ways. 119 For example, lack of certification affects 
114. See Berg, supra note 6, at 23. 
115. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 3, § 3-5. 
116. Doctors must be licensed by a state to practice medicine. See HALL ET 
AL., supra note 110, at 811. Thus, doctors can practice medicine without being 
"certified." See Laura Meckler, Periodic Reviews Urged for Health Care 
Professionals, REG., Oct. 24, 1998, at 20 (arguing for periodic review of 
professional credentials). However, these minimal licensing standards only 
serve to ensure that "the most egregiously incompetent health professionals are 
prohibited from practicing." Id. (quoting former Senator George Mitchell, 
Chairman, Pew Health Professions Commission). 
117. Am. Bd. of Med. Specialists, Ask AMBS: F AQ, What Does It Mean for a 
Doctor to Be Board Certified?, http://www.abms.orglfaq.asp#DBC (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2006). 
118. AMA, Physician Education, Licensure, and Certification, 
http://www.ama-assn.orglaps/physcred.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
119. For an example of the potential trouble of practicing medicine without 
being board certified, see Julie Bell, Recovery in Works at Md. General: 
Scandal-Scarred Hospital Makes Changes That Aid in Regaining Its Patients 
and Its Credibility, BALT. SUN, July 17, 2005, at 1A. Maryland General 
Hospital was subject to multiple lawsuits when many of its physicians were not 
board certified in the areas in which they were performing. For example, one 
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salary, the ability to obtain and the cost of malpractice insurance, 
the validity of informed consent,120 admission to hospital staffs, 
election to membership in professional societies, and credibility as 
rt ·t 121 an expe WI ness. 
In recent years, the United States has suffered from a shortage 
of physicians particularly in the area of primary care,122 which is 
obviously a further threat to patients receiving adequate health 
care.123 Restrictive covenants additionally restrict patients' access to 
physicians of their choosing. 124 Some communities are truly 
half of the anesthesiology department was not board certified. The hospital 
then reformed their organization to employ only physicians who are board 
certified. Id. 
120. Howard v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J. 
2002) (finding that a physician's misrepresentation to a patient regarding board 
certification and experience affected the validity of consent obtained in a 
malpractice suit); see also John J. Smith, Legal Implications of Specialty Board 
Certification, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 73,77-78 (1996). 
121. See Marsingill v. O'Malley, 58 P.3d 495, 501 (Alaska 2002) (recognizing 
that courts have allowed admission of evidence of lack of board certification in 
"cross-examination or in rebuttal when it counteracts affinnative defense 
evidence introduced to show a special degree of skill, knowledge, or relevant 
expertise"). 
122. Physician shortage areas, designated by the Health Care Financing 
Administration, are geographic "areas in the country which have an insufficient 
supply of health care providers to meet the needs of the [surrounding] 
population." Thomas D. Bixby, Network Adequacy: The Regulation of HMOs' 
Network of Health Care Providers, 63 Mo. L. REV. 397, 409 n.122 (1998). "[1]n 
1994, there were 2663 shortage areas in the United States designated as having 
less than one primary care physician [(family practitioner, pediatrician, or 
general internist)] per 3500 people." Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine 
Opens the Door to Alternative Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 200 n.92 
(1998); see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. 
ADMIN., BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, SHORTAGE DESIGNATION, 
http://bhpr.hrsa. gov/shortage (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (providing links to 
complete statistics on which areas of the country are designated as shortage 
areas). 
123. Approximately nineteen percent of the U.S. population, or forty-seven 
million Americans, resided in physician shortage areas in 1994. Boozang, supra 
note 122, at 200 n.92. Moreover, physician shortage areas tend to impact the 
rural and inner-city poor far more severely than the rest of the country. "Most 
private doctors are not located where poor people live and the number of poor 
needing quality, continuous health care far exceeds the capacity of well-
meaning private physicians." Anna-Katrina S. Christakis, Comment, 
Emergency Room Gatekeeping: A New Twist on Patient Dumping, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 295, 297 n.9 (citations omitted); see also Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid 
Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 191, 196-97 (1995) (describing the shortage of private physicians in 
inner-city and rural communities that result from low Medicaid 
reimbursements). 
124. Some courts have recognized that physician restrictive covenants may 
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endangered by the shortage of available physicians caused by 
restrictive covenants,125 but according to most courts, this does not 
present a sufficient public interest. 126 
D. Viewing the Public Interest with More Depth: Elevating the 
Physician-Patient Relationship Through Application of a New Test 
Although almost all states have faced and struggled with the 
issues that arise under physician restrictive covenants,127 over the 
past two decades, only a very small minority of courts has come to 
grips with this contradiction. In some cases, this minority has 
explored the depth of the doctor-patient relationship and how 
restrictive covenants may affect individual patients. In Duffner v. 
Alberty,128 an Arkansas appellate court found that the public interest 
involved in a covenant-not-to-compete between orthopedic surgeons 
included "the public right of availability of the [specialist] it prefers 
to use."129 The court also found that the surgeons attempting to 
enforce the covenant did not have a significant interest in the 
patients with which the departing physician had a preexisting 
relationship.130 While this brief opinion did not expound further on 
this point, it is significant that the court felt it necessary to make a 
distinction between those patients who may have desired a 
harm the public if enforcement will lead to a shortage of health care providers 
within the covenant areas. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So.2d 805, 809-10 
(Ala. 1968) (refusing to uphold a restrictive covenant because of a recognized 
need for more Ear, Nose, and Throat specialists within the area and thus "it 
would be adverse to the public interest" to prevent the physician from practicing 
medicine there); Fumo v. Med. Group of Mich. City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1109 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1169-70 (N.J. 1978); 
Statesville Med. Group v. Dickey, 106 N.C. App. 669, 673-74, 418 S.E.2d 256, 
259 (1992); Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 101 N.C. App. 341, 344-45, 399 S.E.2d 
363, 366 (1991); New Castle Orthopedic Assocs. v. Burns, 392 A.2d 1383, 1387-
88 (Pa. 1978). 
125. See Joe Manning, Frustration Grows with Racine's Doctor Shortage: As 
Physicians Leave Town, Focus is on Dominant All Saints Health System, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 28, 1998, at Dl. 
126. See, e.g., Long v. Huffman, 557 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) 
(noting that the shortage of doctors was so "pandemic" that to lose a physician 
in one area means that the physician will then be more available elsewhere). 
127. For a representative sample, see Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 
P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999); Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic, 299 P.2d 977 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1956); Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Tr. v. Sanal, 837 So.2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003); Gen. Surgery, P.A. v. Suppes, 953 P.2d 1055 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); 
Oak Orchard Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Blasco, 800 N.Y.S.2d 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2005); Mkparu v. Ohio Heart Care, Inc., 740 N.E.2d 293 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999); 
Hosp. Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
128. 718 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986). 
129. [d. at 113-14. 
130. [d. at 114. 
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continuation of their relationship with the departing physician and 
those who had never seen that physician. 131 While not explicitly 
addressing the rights of individual patients to choose their 
physicians, the Duffner court was one of the earliest at least to 
identify the individual patients as parties that must be considered 
as part of the public policy inquiry. 
Other courts have examined the issue of patient choice more 
closely, but only when the surrounding circumstances force them to 
do SO.132 For instance, in Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. 
Petrozza,133 the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to enforce a 
restrictive covenant that would have created at least a temporary 
monopoly even though the duration and geographic scope of the 
covenant were found reasonable. l34 In striking down a restrictive 
covenant between gastroenterologists, the court stated that "[t]he 
doctor-patient relationship is a personal one and we are extremely 
hesitant to deny the patient-consumer any choice whatsoever,,,135 
siding with the departing physician who argued the covenant would 
create a shortage of gastroenterologists in the area. 136 
Although this sort of geographical and statistical analysis can 
be useful in constructing the underpinnings of a more thoughtful 
public policy analysis, other courts have approached the analysis 
from a different and factually based perspective. The Ohio Court of 
131. Id. 
132. See Pathology Consultants v. Gratton, 343 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Iowa 1984) 
(refusing to enforce a covenant that would result in a monopoly on laboratory 
services on the grounds that a monopoly was "not in the best interests of the 
public"); Statesville Med. Group v. Dickey, 106 N.C. App. 669, 672-74, 418 
S.E.2d 256, 258-60 (1992) (voiding a covenant-not-to-compete between 
endocrinologists because the enforcement would have created a two-year 
monopoly and would have deprived a rural community of the only 
endocrinologist who both lived and worked therein). But see Canfield v. Spear, 
254 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ill. 1969) ("If a severe shortage exists in any particular 
place [because of enforcement] young doctors will tend to move there, thus 
alleviating the shortage."). 
133. 92 N.C. App. 21, 373 S.E.2d 449 (1988). In Petrozza, a North Carolina 
professional association of gastroenterologists sought enforcement of a 
restrictive covenant that barred a departing physician-employee from practicing 
for three years within twenty miles of the clinic's principal place of business and 
within five miles of any hospital or office served by the corporation. Id. at 22-
23, 373 S.E.2d at 450-51. 
134. See id. at 27, 30-31, 373 S.E.2d at 453, 455. "The creation of a 
monopoly also raises the issue of the public's interest in having some choice in 
the selection of a physician." Id. at 31, 373 S.E.2d at 455. The court also noted 
throughout the opinion that gastroenterologists are likely to be needed in an 
emergency context, raising the stakes in the public interest analysis. Id. 
135. Id. at 31, 373 S.E.2d at 455. 
136. See id. at 28, 31, 373 S.E.2d at 453, 455. 
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Appeals in Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll,137 for instance, overturned a 
district-court referee's ruling that voi'ded restrictive covenants 
between physicians per se but, in so doing, acknowledged that the 
public policy consideration must include the rights of individual 
patients. 13s Notably, this court also stated that competition, 
especially between doctors, must be encouraged.1a9 
Drawing on the Duffner and Petrozza decisions, the Arizona 
Supreme Court rendered a thoughtful and in-depth analysis of the 
physician-patient relationship and its effect on restrictive covenants 
between doctors in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber. 140 The 
Arizona high court is one of the only courts in the nation to have 
fully integrated the AMA guidelines into its public interest analysis. 
The court upheld a lower court opinion that struck down a 
restrictive covenant between pulmonologists partly because of the 
"sensitive and personal nature of the doctor-patient relationship,"141 
finding that "the doctor-patient relationship is special and entitled 
to unique protection. It cannot be easily or accurately compared to 
relationships in the commercial context."142 In so doing, the court 
noted that while the AMA discouragement of restrictive covenants 
was not binding on the physicians, it was relevant to the public 
interest inquiry, especially in light of the fact that such agreements 
between lawyers were illegal. 143 While the court did not rule that 
covenants between physicians were per se against public policy, it 
did warn that they must be "strictly construed" in light of their 
impact on the doctor-patient relationship.l44 
137. 594 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). The trial-court referee's decision 
relied heavily on AMA guidelines in banning the covenants. The appellate 
court, however, held that the AMA guidelines only discourage restrictive 
covenants, and do net ban them. [d. at 1030-31. For a further discussion of 
restrictive covenants in Ohio, see generally Pierre H. Bergeron, Navigating the 
"Deep and Unsettled Sea" of Covenant Not to Compete Litigation in Ohio: A 
Comprehensive Look, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 373 (2000). 
138. Ohio Urology, 594 N.E.2d at 1030. 
139. [d. (citing an AMA provision as support, the court stated that 
"competition among physicians is to be encouraged"). 
140. 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999). 
141. [d. at 1285. 
142. [d. at 1283. 
143. [d. at 1282-83. 
144. [d. at 1286. 
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III. SOLUTION STOCKPILE:.PROFFERED SOLUTIONS FOR EVALUATING 
PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
The interests of incumbent patients must be considered in any 
judicial evaluation of a physician restrictive covenant for two 
reasons: the potential health risks created when incumbent patients 
are not allowed to continue care with their doctor and the 
importance of allowing physicians to fulfill their professional duties 
to their patients. The rule of reason test as presently applied fails to 
accord proper weight to these considerations. The courts must 
fashion a new approach to bring incumbent patient interests to the 
fore of the analysis. Several solutions to this problem have been 
suggested by commentators and applied by courtS.145 
One potential solution discussed below is for the AMA to take a 
stronger stance against physician restrictive covenants, much like 
the American Bar Association ("ABA") guidelines, that courts can 
then follow. 146 However, the author concludes that the courts should 
apply a reformulated rule of reason test wherein incumbent patients 
are treated as quasi third-party beneficiaries to physician restrictive 
covenants. 147 
A. The AMA's Indecision 
Courts usually will enforce restrictive covenants against most 
professionals; however, attorneys are a notable exception. Most 
courts simply invalidate attorney restrictive covenants by citing a 
per se rule derived from the profession's own ethical standards. l48 
The per se rule is an absolute bar to enforcement of any restriction 
on a lawyer's right to practice.149 Although the judiciary has applied 
this per se rule to covenants between attorneys, such an approach 
has not been adopted for physicians. Instead, when dealing with 
145. See infra notes 146-204 and accompanying text. 
146. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text. 
147. See infra Part V. 
148. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 
N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990) (invalidating an agreement that stopped 
payment of withdrawal benefits if the withdrawing partner committed an act 
detrimental to the firm); Minge v. Weeks, 629 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App. 1993); 
Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 1993); 
Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tenn. 1991) 
(declaring unenforceable an agreement which provided that an employee who 
withdrew from the firm would receive deferred compensation unless she 
continued to practice law). But see Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 
1993); Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1991); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), reu'd, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992). 
149. See cases cited supra note 148. 
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physician restrictive covenants, courts apply the same rule of reason 
test as used for commercial parties.150 Thus, despite the apparent 
professional similarities between doctors and lawyers, the courts 
have treated similar contractual relationships within the two 
professions quite differently.151 
One key reason for this disparity involves the divergent ethical 
codes of the two professions.152 The ABA Committee on Professional 
Ethics has explicitly declared that restrictive covenants between 
attorneys are unethical153 whereas the AMA's position on the issue 
has been neither clear nor consistent. 154 
In 1933, the AMA declared that restrictive covenants were 
unethical/55 but it subsequently reversed itself in 1960.156 While 
more recently the AMA has discouraged physician restrictive 
covenants as "not in the public interest,,,157 it has come just short of 
150. See Berg, supra note 6, at 4-6 ("[N)on-competition agreements between 
physicians, like noncompetition agreements between attorneys, should be per se 
invalid. "). 
151. Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and 
Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988) ("The reasons for 
distinguishing lawyering from other professions in this context are vague, and 
it is questionable whether the availability of choice for the client is any less 
critical when the professional engaged is a physician, for example, rather than a 
lawyer."); see also Howard, 863 P.2d at 160; Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 
1171 (N.J. 1978) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) ("Both [the doctor-patient and 
lawyer-client) relationships are consensual, highly fiduciary and peculiarly 
dependent on the patient's or client's trust and confidence in the physician 
consulted or attorney retained."); Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307, 1310-12 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1982) (Buttler, J., dissenting) (arguing for the application of the per se rule 
to doctors). 
152. See AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION: INCLUDING THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND RULES OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, § E-9.06 
(1982). For a comparison of the AMA advisory rules to the ABA rules of ethics, 
see Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1167-68 & n.6. 
153. See ABA Comm. on Prof! Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). 
154. In 1960, the AMA focused primarily upon the fairness of a 
noncompetition agreement as between the affected doctors, indicating that 
noncompetition agreements are not inherently unethical. See Berg, supra note 
6, at 6-9. The AMA, however, did acknowledge, at least, that questions 
remained as to whether enforcement of an agreement was harmful to the 
public. See id. at 7. 
155. See id. at 6-7 (citing AMA, 1846-1958 DIGEST OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS 123 
(1959». 
156. See id. at 7 (citing AMA, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL 25 (1960». 
157. AMA, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL 
AFFAIRS § 9.02 (1989). Several other provisions of the AMA's Code of Medical 
Ethics state that "[flree choice of physicians is the right of every individual," 
AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.06 (1994), and that competition among 
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calling the pacts unethical, except in particular cases where the 
covenants are "excessive in geographic scope or duration. . . or if 
they fail to make reasonable accommodation of patients' choice of 
h .. ,,158 P YSICIan. 
Furthermore, the AMA's guarded warning on restrictive 
covenants is merely advisory and does not bind AMA members, 
unlike the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the ABA. 159 The 
AMA concedes most states will enforce reasonable noncompetition 
agreements. 160 The AMA even goes so far as to suggest that 
physicians forming a medical practice should consider the 
advantages of restrictive and liquidated damages covenants. 161 
Many courts do not consider the AMA opinions because restrictive 
covenants are not expressly prohibited by them and because the 
AMA is not an agency of the government.162 And, while most states 
have adopted some form of the ABA's Model Rules, AMA opinions 
have been neither adopted nor codified.163 
Although AMA opinions do not bind their members, the AMA is 
a persuasive, policy-guiding body for physicians. 164 If the AMA took 
a stronger stance against physician restrictive covenants, courts 
might be convinced of the importance of the public policies against 
oppressive restrictive covenants. However, because the AMA is not 
a government agency, even a stronger statement by the AMA may 
physicians is not only ethical but encouraged, id. § 6.11. 
158. AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.02 (2004); see also Cathy Tokarski, 
No Way Out: When Practice Management Firms Fail, Restrictive Covenants Can 
Make a Bad Situation Worse, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998, at 27 
159. See AMA Judicial Council, Op. 9.06 (1982). For a comparison of the 
AMA advisory rules to the ABA rules of ethics, see Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 
1161, 1167-68 (N.J. 1978). 
160. See Michael R. Sullivan, Note, Covenants-not-to-compete and 
Liquidated Damages Clauses: Diagnosis and Treatment for Physicians, 46 S.C. 
L. REV. 505,514 (1995) (citing Andrea Cooper, Restrictive Covenants, 248 JAMA 
3091, 3091 (1982». 
161. [d. Liquidated damages covenants can be just as troubling as 
covenants-not-to-compete because they may persuade a physician to choose 
economic interests over patient interests, thus harming the doctor-patient 
relationship. See Joelyn Knopf Levy, Because Judges Went to Law School, Not 
Medical School: Restrictive Covenants in the Practices of Law and Medicine, 30 
J. HEALTH & Hasp. L. 89, 98-100 (1997) (arguing that courts should treat 
restrictive covenants between physicians the same way they treat those 
between attorneys). 
162. There are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. 
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that the similarity between 
AMA discouragement of restrictive covenants and the ABA's ban on such to be 
relevant to the public policy inquiry). 
163. See Knopf, supra note 161, at 93. 
164. See AMA, About AMA Policy, http://www.ama-assn.org/amaJ 
pub/category/8151.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
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not be a sufficient solution. 
B. The Blue Pencil Rule: Make Your Own Contract 
The blue pencil rule has been used by courts to modify 
unreasonable covenants-not-to-compete. The majority approach is 
exemplified by the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of 
Indiana in Product Action International, Inc. u. Mero. 165 The Indiana 
court stated that the blue pencil rule allows a court to strike 
unreasonable portions of a covenant-not-to-compete if those portions 
are logically and grammatically severable from the remainder of the 
contract. 166 Although this approach allows a court to enforce 
reasonable terms in the contract, a court may not create a new 
contract by adding new terms to which the parties did not agree.167 
This solution may work to protect an employee from undue hardship 
or an employer's protectable interest. On the other hand, the blue 
pencil is not a solution that protects a patient's interests. The blue 
pencil doctrine does not force courts to consider an incumbent 
patient's interests in a physician's covenant-not-to-compete. If 
courts are forced to consider the patient's interests in the public 
policy prong as proposed, the blue pencil doctrine may then be used 
to ensure the covenant-not-to-compete is only as restrictive as 
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest. However, 
standing alone, the blue pencil doctrine does not do enough to 
protect patients' interests. 
C. Liquidated Damages 
Many covenants-not-to-compete between physicians give the 
contracting physician the option of paying liquidated damages in the 
alternative to abiding by the geographical and time restrictions of 
the agreement.16B Some courts and commentators argue that these 
damages are less harmful to physicians and their patient 
relationships than enforcement of the restrictive covenant through 
injunctive relief. 169 The amounts of these damages are often 
165. 277 F. Supp. 2d 919 (S.D. Ind. 2003). 
166. Id. at 926. 
167. Id. at 928. 
168. See, e.g., Farber, 982 P.2d at 1279; Dickinson Med. Group, P.A. v. Foote, 
No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1984); Raymundo v. 
Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 278 (Ind. 1983); see also Serena L. 
Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition Clauses in 
Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 
31 AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 40-41 (1993) (noting how common liquidated damages 
clauses are in restrictive covenants). 
169. See, e.g., Dental East, P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1988); see also Lowry, supra note 1, at 232 (noting that liquidated 
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extremely high. 170 While arguments may be made that such 
prOVISIons are a workable alternative for physicians who wish to 
preserve relationships with their patients, the reality is that such 
provisions are only an option for only the wealthiest physicians. 171 
Additionally, viewing the payment of liquidated damages as making 
a plaintiff whole in cases involving noncompete clauses between 
physicians only furthers the problematic view that a physician's 
patients are merely constituent parts of a commercial marketplace 
and nothing more. It is also important to note that courts that have 
found covenants-not-to-compete between physicians to be 
unenforceable for public policy reasons have found alternative 
liquidated damages clauses to be similarly void. 172 
D. The Per Se Rule: The Pitfalls of Fighting Fire with Fire 
Many highly respected judges and scholars advocate adopting 
the per se rule, currently applied to analyze the validity of attorney 
restrictive covenants, to physician restrictive covenants. 173 Both 
Professor Berg174 and a variety of judges,175 argue that physicians 
damages act to compensate the former employer "without hindering the public's 
choice of physicians"). 
170. See, e.g., Junkin v. Ne. Ark. Internal Med. Clinic, P.A., 42 S.W.3d 432, 
435 (Ark. 2001) (stating that liquidated damages clause required payment of 
$174,388 in instance of breach). 
171. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": 
Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 
621 (arguing that antitrust law should be applied to restrictive covenants). 
172. See Junkin, 42 S.W.3d at 438 ("Common sense dictates that if a 
restrictive covenant cannot be specifically enforced because it violates public 
policy, then a related liquidated-damages provision also cannot be enforced."); 
Duneland Emergency Physician's Med. Group v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963, 967 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("[BJecause the non-compete covenant is unenforceable, 
Duneland is not entitled to liquidated damages. "). 
173. See Berg, supra note 6 at 36-37; Richard P. Bergen, Practical 
Considerations on Restrictive Covenants, 203 JAMA 197, 198 (1968); Hillman, 
supra note 150, at 20; see also Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 811 (Ala. 1968) 
(emphasizing the similarities in the relationships between a doctor and patient 
and lawyer and client: "[tJhe patient or client is not a 'customer"'). 
174. See Berg, supra note 6, at 36-37. She argues: 
Id. 
The inconsistent judicial treatment of restrictive covenants between 
these two types of professionals cannot be justified. Indeed, the 
philosophical and public policy underpinnings of the per se rule apply 
with greater force to restrictive covenants between physicians than to 
restrictive covenants between attorneys. Simply put, if the reasoning 
behind the per se rule for attorneys is valid, the reasoning applies 
even more strongly to physicians. 
175. For example, Justice Sullivan, in Karlin v. Weinberg, states his 
concerns eloquently: 
The restrictive covenant, which the Court is upholding in principle, 
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should be subjected to a per se rule against restrictive covenants, 
just as lawyers are currently, since the per se rule provides for 
greater protection for physician-employees as well as their patients. 
Applying the per se rule to physician covenants is sometimes 
advocated because it is an easy and efficient rule for courts to 
apply. 176 If all physician covenants are presumed by courts to be 
void, fewer cases will likely be brought, and those that are brought 
are more easily decided, saving judicial resources. Another reason 
for extending the per se rule to physicians is the law's inconsistent 
treatment of two professions that seem to share a great many 
similarities: physicians and attorneys.177 An apparent inconsistency 
also exists between the high regard for a physician/patient 
relationship at trial and the low regard for that same relationship 
£, t"t f 178 or con lllUl y 0 care. 
If state supreme courts were to adopt a per se rule for 
restrictive covenants among physicians, as they are adopting 
regarding attorneys, the criticisms directed at the current majority 
use of the rule of reason test would be just as apt. Moreover, two 
additional problems arise when a per se rule is applied to 
physicians: 1) a per se rule is an utterly inflexible means of weighing 
both the clients' and employers' interests and 2) though a physician 
is not a plumber, many find it hard to believe that a physician is 
sufficiently analogous to an attorney for the per se rule and its 
. It 1 179 ratlOna e 0 app y. 
If a per se rule against restrictive covenants were applied to 
physicians, many of their interests would be ignored and trampled. 
Doctors who leave an organization may exploit personal and referral 
relationships they gained while employed with the company. 
Without some enforcement of restrictive covenants, individual 
does violence to the concept of the physician-patient relationship. A 
person requiring medical treatment and advice goes to the doctor of 
his or her choice .... The relationship is so personal and so sensitive, 
and the right of a patient to consult the physician of one's own choice 
so fundamental, that a restrictive covenant which substantially 
intrudes on that relationship and interferes with that fundamental 
right should be held contrary to public policy. 
Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1170-71 (N.J. 1978) (Sullivan, J., 
dissenting). 
176. See Antitrust HealthCare Advancement Act of 1996: Hearing on H.R. 
2925 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,. 104th Congo (1996) (statement of 
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ 
pitofsky/pithtl.htm. 
177. See Odess, 211 So. 2d at 811; Berg, supra note 6, at 36-37. 
178. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 474-75. 
179. See, e.g., Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1167-69; Ohio Urology, Inc. V. Poll, 594 
N.E.2d 1027, 1030-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
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physicians would be permitted to pull patients away from the very 
company that trained them and provided them with the knowledge 
necessary to accommodate those patients. The medical profession is 
a delicate one, involving many interests of many different parties, 
and a per se rule against restrictive covenants would only serve to 
ignore those different individual interests. 
The primary shortcoming of the per se rule as applied to either 
attorneys or physicians is that it assumes that a particular result is 
always appropriate. The main thrust of this Article has not been to 
discredit the need for restrictive covenants between physicians in all 
contexts. Rather, it has been to highlight the disturbing 
incongruities that exist between the very complex web of 
relationships and interests among doctors and patients and the 
pitifully simple regime that many courts have adopted in order to 
evaluate those relationships. In fact, the per se rule as it stands 
regarding attorneys in nearly every jurisdiction is vulnerable to 
these same criticisms. ISO California also has recognized this flaw in 
the per se approach and has adopted a judicial mechanism, which 
more closely resembles the rule of reason test, allowing more factors 
than just the interest of the client to be taken into account. ISI 
180. See Glenn S. Draper, Comment, Enforcing Lawyers' Covenants not to 
compete, 69 WASH. L. REV. 161,174 (1994); Kalish, supra note 21, at 451. 
181. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 156 (Cal. 1993) (upholding 
noncompete clause in partnership agreement); see also Haight, Brown & 
Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 
(upholding a restrictive covenant that financially penalized departing attorneys 
by causing forfeiture of post-breakup fees). "These decisions [result partially 
froml the fact that California's ethical code is slightly different from the Model 
Code or Model Rules and can be read to allow enforcement of restrictive 
covenants." John Ritsick, Ethical Concerns in Law Firm Breakups: Solicitation, 
Restrictive Covenants, and Conflict Issues, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 362 
(1998). California's Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "tal member [of 
the State Barl shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an 
agreement ... [thatl restricts the right of a member to practice law." CAL. 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-500(A) (2006). Similarly, Model Rule 5.6(a) 
provides that "tal lawyer shall not participate in offering or making (a) a 
partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to 
practice after termination of the relationship." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (1983). The Haight court, however, interpreted the 
California state provision to prohibit only agreements which caused attorneys 
to "refrain altogether from the practice of law." Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848. 
The Haight court decided to expand its interpretation of Rule 1-500, in part, 
based on an 1872 Civil Code. Id. at 847. Additionally, the court noted that 
"Business and Professions Code section 16602 provides that '[alny partner may 
. . . agree that he will not carry on a similar business within a specified 
[geographic areal.'" Id. The Haight court noted the 1872 provision had "never 
been amended to prohibit attorneys from availing themselves of the contractual 
rights contained therein." Id. For a further discussion of the Haight case, see 
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Moreover, a number of scholars have argued for the application 
of the rule of reason to attorney restrictive covenants to permit for 
more flexibility.182 For example, Professor Wilcox argues for the 
termination of the per se rule for lawyers. He contends that it is "[a] 
fundamental principle of contract law" that "any harm to the public 
resulting from enforcement [of restrictive covenants] must not 
outweigh the value of the interests protected by the restriction.,,183 
The per se rule, therefore, wrongly assumes that the public interest 
will always outweigh the benefits to law firms, or physician 
employers, who wish restrictive covenants enforced. l84 Ai:, noted 
above, physician-employers may wish to protect patient lists; 
likewise, law firms may wish to protect client patronage in matters 
already handled by the firm and protecting new matters involving 
. t' l' t 185 eXls lng c len s. 
From a practical perspective, implementing a per se rule would 
be nothing short of revolutionary in most jurisdictions and would 
likely be met with resistance. While the public policy prong of the 
rule of reason test must be strengthened significantly, it should not 
devour the other prongs as it has in most jurisdictions regarding 
lawyers. The fact that many of the rational underpinnings of the 
per se rule have been reiterated and buttressed in this Article does 
not mean that a per se rule is the appropriate result. Advocating 
such would simply be replacing one overly simplistic and oppressive 
regime with another. 
generally Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law 
Firm Agreements Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & 
Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889 
(1992). 
182. See, e.g., Kafker, supra note 168, at 58 ("As the practice of law has 
become more and more a business, the justification for treating legal 
partnerships differently from other professions has become less compelling, 
notwithstanding the ethical code ofthe legal profession. A reasonable forfeiture 
clause would not impose an absolute restriction and would protect the dominant 
interest of the client as well as those of the departing partner and the firm."); 
Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While 
Maintaining the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 915, 937-41 (2000); Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Comment, Let's Be 
Reasonable: Rethinking the Prohibition Against Noncompete Clauses in 
Employment Contracts Between Attorneys in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
249, 266-78 (2003) (urging the revision of ethical rules to permit law firms to 
use noncompetition agreements with the application of the common law 
reasonableness standard). 
183. Wilcox, supra note 182, at 965. 
184. See id. at 932. 
185. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text. 
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E. The Antitrust Approach: Another Method of Oversimplification 
Over the years, physician-employees have sought to use federal 
and state antitrust laws to challenge covenants-not-to-compete. lS6 
This antitrust analysis may be viewed as a variation of the per se 
rule described above, as the restrictive covenant, if in violation of 
antitrust rules, will not be enforced due to its anti competitive 
effects. Such an analysis, proffered by Charles Sullivan and Arthur 
Di Dio, among others, does not offer the enhanced flexibility that a 
more nuanced rule of reason approach would provide. ls7 
Professor Sullivan observes that the common law rule of reason 
for restrictive covenants overvalues the individual interests of the 
employer and employee, while failing to sufficiently consider the 
agreement's broader anticompetitive effects. ISS He convincingly 
argues that the application of federal antitrust principles would 
demand a more precise analysis for the noncompete agreement's 
impact on the relevant market because these principles would better 
assess the overall reasonableness of anti-competition agreements. lS9 
However, this antitrust approach fails to differentiate the unique 
and special relationship between physicians and their patients from 
other commercial relationships.190 Moreover, it fails to take note of 
the difficulties that physicians have using antitrust laws to void 
restrictive covenants. 
In his article, The Legal Implications of Noncompetition 
Agreements in Physician Contracts, Di Dio discusses the many legal 
hurdles a physician will face in using federal antitrust law to 
challenge the validity of a noncom petition agreement. 19l The first 
challenge is jurisdictional: whether or not federal antitrust law is 
applicable requires that the noncompetition agreement (or rather, 
the enforcement thereof) substantially affects interstate 
commerce. 192 Although the Supreme Court held that the "learned 
professions," including attorneys 193 and physicians,194 are part of 
186. See, e.g., Blank v. Preventive Health Programs, 504 F. Supp. 416, 418-
20 (S.D. Ga. 1980). 
187. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 464-71; Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the 
"Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of 
Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621, 625-32. 
188. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 642. 
189. Id. at 643. 
190. See id. at 625-26. 
191. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 465-71. See generally Jill Moore Mayo, 
Comment, The Antitrust Ramifications of Noncompetition Clauses in the 
Partnership and Employment Agreements of Doctors, 30 Loy. L. REV. 307 (1984). 
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
193. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). 
194. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982); see 
Carl F. Ameringer, Federal Antitrust Policy and Physician Discontent: Defining 
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trade and commerce for Sherman Act purposes, the problem has 
been demonstrating that restrictive covenants have an 
anticompetitive effect.195 Di Dio outlines in detail the potential 
difficulties a physician may have in establishing such an 
anticompetitive effect.196 He states: 
This anticompetitive effect must occur in the relevant market; 
it is not sufficient that the plaintiff demonstrate that the 
covenant hindered the plaintiffs ability alone to compete in 
the market. That anticompetitive effects "must be judged in 
relation to the market" rather than in relation to the plaintiff 
alone is a potential barrier to a successful antitrust challenge 197 to a covenant not to compete. 
He concludes that most courts find that the procompetitive 
justifications of a restrictive covenant outweigh any "anticompetitive 
effects. ,,198 
Moreover, a 1982 Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") complaint 
leveled at the medical community ordered, among other things, that 
the AMA cease and desist from declaring that restrictive covenants 
in physician contracts were unethical. 199 The basis for this FTC 
order came from economists who argued that "ethical restrictions on 
advertising, solicitation, and contract practice increased costS.,,200 
For a time, the nation trusted that decentralized, competitive 
markets in health care and insurance would constrain costs while 
encouraging quality.201 Now, some commentators suggest that a lack 
of regulation of both HMO mergers and physician practice groups 
has led to an increase in anticompetitive behavior that federal 
enforcement is either unwilling or unable to contro1.202 
Moments in the Struggle for Congressional Relief, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 
543, 549 (2002). 
195. The requirement that the antitrust activity substantially affect 
interstate commerce was explained by the Court in Summit Health, Ltd. v. 
Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991). The Court stated, "[t]he competitive significance 
of [a single surgeon's] exclusion from the market must be measured ... by a 
general evaluation of the impact of the restraint on other participants and 
potential participants in the market from which he has been excluded." [d. at 
332. 
196. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 469-71. 
197. [d. 
198. See id. at 470-71. 
199. See Ameringer, supra note 194, at 550-51. 
200. [d. at 550. 
201. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future Of 
Competition Law in Health Care, 21 HEALTH AFF., Mar.lApr. 2002, at 185, 186; 
see also Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on 
Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1071, 1072-74. 
202. Greaney, supra note 201, at 186; John A. Powers, Note, The Stifling of 
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Another reason for the possible increase of antitrust activity is 
that lower courts "find themselves at sea" trying to interpret and 
apply the complex economic inquiry required to determine if 
antitrust activity has resulted in "cause-effect relationships between 
professional restraints and economic outcome.,,203 So, even if 
antitrust legislation may be applicable to physician restrictive 
covenants, the complexity, cost, and uncertain nature of legal action 
in this area cannot currently provide a practical solution to the 
problems arising from restrictive covenants. 
If these jurisdictional requirements are met, the courts will 
apply the rule of reason to covenants-not-to-compete. Therefore, 
such an analysis provides no nuanced solution to the problem of 
physician restrictive covenants; it simply clears the way for federal 
antitrust law to augment the rule of reason test used by a majority 
of jurisdictions.204 Such an approach is helpful only to the extent 
that a court may take such factors into consideration as a 
component of a more far-reaching factual inquiry and subsequent in-
depth analysis. 
IV. BORROWING FROM THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES: AN 
ENLIGHTENED RULE OF REASON TEST 
The application of the current rule of reason framework to 
physician restrictive covenants fails to adequately protect the 
physician-patient relationship. In balancing the freedom to contract 
and this special relationship, courts should not automatically favor 
the employer's interest in protecting its business interests over the 
physician-employee's relationship with his or her patients. 
Absent from current rule of reason analysis is a recognition that 
protecting the physician-patient relationship serves important 
public policy and health values. 205 Although an employer may have 
legitimate, and even compelling reasons, for enforcing a restrictive 
covenant in some specific contexts,206 these facts provide no 
justification for abandoning a priori the importance of a patient's 
continuing relationship with a physician in all situations. An 
evaluation of a physician restrictive covenant should be cabined by a 
Competition by the Antitrust Laws: The Irony of the Health Care Industry, 15 J. 
L. & HEALTH 223, 224 (2000-2001). 
203. Greaney, supra note 201, at 189. 
204. Di Dio, supra note 9, at 469 ("Under the federal antitrust laws, a 
covenant-not-to-compete is valid if it is ancillary to the main business purpose 
of a lawful contract and necessary to protect the covenantee's legitimate 
property interests, which require that the covenants be as limited as is 
reasonable to protect the covenantee's interests."). 
205. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
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guiding principle recognizing that the interest of incumbent patients 
to maintain their relationship with their physician has value and 
deserves greater protection in appropriate contexts. 
Courts must not permit an employer to squelch physician-
patient relationships for any reason. On the other hand, not all 
physician-patient relationships are deserving of a high level of 
protection.207 In short, courts must evaluate the strength of a 
physician-employee's claim for nonenforcement of a restrictive 
covenant on a content-specific basis, providing greater scrutiny at 
times, while applying a normal rule of reason standard to other 
cases. 
The current rule of reason treats all physician-patient 
relationships as having equal value to the patient and the patient's 
health.208 The result of this analytical approach is decisions that 
often appear arbitrary and unfair.209 Most courts look at the public 
policy prong of the rule of reason test to only require that a 
minimum number of physicians reside in a particular area, rather 
than taking into account weighty issues such as preservation of 
patient choice, encouragement of competition between physicians, 
quality of patient care, and continuity ofthat care.210 Such a greater 
content-specific approach may be had by applying a quasi third-
party beneficiary analysis to the incumbent patients under the 
public policy prong of the rule of reason. 
207. Some physician-patient relationships are of short duration due to the 
type of medicine a doctor practices. A meeting with a radiologist generally will 
not lead to a long-term health care relationship. Other doctors, such as 
oncologists, see a patient frequently and develop a deeper and continuing 
relationship with the patient. 
208. Cf Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 
29-31, 373 S.E.2d 449, 454-55 (1988) (focusing its rule of reason analysis on the 
availability of any gastroenterologist to the community rather than focusing on 
availability of a particular gastroenterologist to the community), affd, 324 N.C. 
327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1989). 
209. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) ("Despite our sympathy for the rights of patients to choose their own 
doctors, we are constrained to follow the long line of precedent ... finding non-
competition agreements enforceable in the medical profession." (internal 
citations omitted»; Bloomington Urological Assocs., SC v. Scaglia, 686 N.E.2d 
389, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (acknowledging the sacrosanct relationship 
between the contracting physician and his patients before declaring a 
noncompete agreement between physicians enforceable); Willman v. Beheler, 
499 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (holding a covenant-not-to-compete valid even 
though a shortage of surgeons existed in the area because there existed such 
shortages in many areas). 
210. See, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1986). But see, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283 
(Ariz. 1999). 
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A third-party beneficiary is "[a] person who, though not a party 
to a contract, stands to benefit from the contract's performance.,,211 
There are two separate classes of third-party beneficiaries: intended 
beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries. A party outside of a 
contract qualifies as an intended third-party beneficiary if the 
parties to the contract intended to give that outside party the benefit 
of the contract's promised performance.212 Both parties to the 
contract must undertake a clear and direct obligation to the third 
party;213 it is not enough to show a party will derive some benefit 
from the contract.214 Although other parties may be affected by 
contracts (incidental beneficiaries), only intended third-party 
beneficiaries have rights under a contract for their benefit.215 
Courts have found third-party beneficiaries to exist in a wide 
variety of contractual situations,216 affecting a wide variety of 
relationships between the parties to the contract and the would-be 
third-party beneficiary. For instance, courts have often found 
tenants of buildings, whether commercial or residential, to be third-
party beneficiaries of contracts to improve, expand, or otherwise 
physically alter the property.217 Children are always third-party 
211. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8th ed. 2004). 
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). 
213. However, according to Perry v. Baptist Health, No. 03-1130, 2004 WL 
1406092 (Ark. June 24, 2004), it is not necessary to name a person in the 
contract if that person is a member of a class sufficiently described or 
designated in the contract. Id. at *3. 
214. Id.; Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., No. XOICV990156198S, 2000 
WL 1768354, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2000) ("[TJhird-party beneficiary 
status is not established merely by showing that one will receive some benefit 
from the contract or that one is affected by it."). 
215. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ill. 1982) (holding 
that intent to benefit the third party must be the primary or direct purpose of 
the transaction or relationship and is "an indispensable element of a third-party 
beneficiary theory of recovery"). 
216. See, e.g., Little Rock Wastewater Util. v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 
902 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 (Ark. 1995) (holding that a highway construction firm 
was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the state and utility 
company when utility company took too long to finish a job, thus delaying the 
construction company's work); Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 654 A.2d 342, 347 (Conn. 
1995) (considering a landlord to be a third-party beneficiary to agreement 
assigning a lease from one tenant to another); Tredrea v. Anesthesia & 
Analgesia, P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Iowa 1998) (holding that independent 
anesthesiologists were third-party beneficiaries to a contract hospital entered 
into with anesthesia partnership, wherein hospital could use independent 
anesthesiologists with partnership's consent); L.A.C. ex rei. D.C. v. Ward 
Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 262 (Mo. 2002) (holding that a 
shopper who was raped at mall was third-party beneficiary of contract between 
mall and security company). 
217. See K-Mart Corp. v. Balfour Beatty, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 634, 635-36 
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beneficiaries of divorce settlements between their parents.218 
Patients can be third-party beneficiaries to contracts between HMOs 
and the patients' doctors.219 It seems logical that a physician's 
patients are necessarily a third-party beneficiary to any employment 
agreement into which the physician enters. 
While the benefit conferred onto a third-party must be more 
than incidental, which normally entails that it be either financial or 
legal in nature, contracts which by their nature affect the physical 
well-being or health of an outside party will create a third-party 
interest in that outside party.220 Because physicians are unique 
among professionals in their overriding duty to attend to the well-
being of those they serve, any contract which may affect their 
employment, especially a restrictive covenant, will always deeply 
affect their patients as well.221 From the Hippocratic Oath to the 
overall theme of the AMA guidelines, every action that a physician 
takes in relation to her employment is undertaken for the benefit of 
her patients, whether the patients are viewed as a class or as 
individuals with individual needs.222 Physicians are employed 
almost exclusively for the purpose of treating patients, and thus, 
inherent in every employment contract is an understanding from 
both parties, the physician and the employer, that patients will 
(D.V.I. 1998); Dist. Moving & Storage Co., Inc. v. Gardiner & Gardiner, Inc., 492 
A.2d 319, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
218. See Smith v. Smith, 218 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) ("As third 
party beneficiaries the beneficial provisions of the contract ordinarily may not 
be modified to their detriment without their consent and may be enforced by 
them or for them."); Chen v. Chen, 840 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
Some commentators have advocated allowing students to sue as third-party 
beneficiaries to the employment contracts between their teachers and their 
school districts as well. See Kevin P. McJessy, Comment, Contract Law: A 
Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1768, 1807-10 (1995). 
219. St. Charles v. Kender, 646 N.E.2d 411,412 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). 
220. See 9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 775 (interim ed. 
2002) ("[Anotherl case may be supposed in which [a third party'sllegal relations 
will not be affected but where performance will necessarily involve his person, 
as where B promises A to render personal service to [that third party], such as 
instruction, advice, or personal care ... . [Tlhe personal contact necessarily 
involved no doubt makes it easier to show an intention on the part of the 
promisee to make [that third partyl the beneficiary."). See also Gooch v. Buford, 
262 F. 894,898 (6th Cir. 1920). 
221. See Devine v. Roche Biomedical Lab., 659 A.2d 868, 870-71 (Me. 1995) 
(holding that a patient would "clearly" be a third-party beneficiary of a service 
contract between a laboratory and his doctor). 
222. See AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
ama/pub/category/printl2512 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); Nat'l Library of Med., 
Greek Medicine, http://www.nlm.nih.govlhmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 230 2006
230 WAKE FOREST LA W REVIEW [Vol. 41 
directly benefit from the contract. 
While at least some courts have recognized the relationship 
between physician-patient relationships and third-party beneficiary 
status,223 they are not exact corollaries and granting third-party 
beneficiary status has some downsides. Third-party beneficiaries 
traditionally have a right to bring a claim for breach of contract.224 
Where the goal of a patient is continuity of care, it is not an 
adequate remedy for that patient to have a right to sue a physician 
or employer for a breach of contract. Allowing patients to sue for 
breaches of employment contracts also jeopardizes the ability of 
employers to make independent hiring and firing decisions. Another 
difficulty with permitting third-party beneficiary status is that the 
scope of the contract limits the scope of the beneficiary status.225 If 
courts grant patients third-party beneficiary status, employers may 
attempt to avoid liability by refusing to mention the quality of care 
physicians must provide, or by refusing to mention treating patients 
at all. Additionally, under some states' laws, third-party beneficiary 
status is currently unavailable to patients because state statutes 
control the definition of beneficiary status.226 Although granting 
third-party beneficiary status to patients would force courts to 
recognize the important physician patient relationship, courts have 
been reluctant to grant this status because of the inherent problems 
associated with third-party beneficiary status.227 
One case that illustrates the difficulties courts have with 
finding the correct approach to the doctor patient relationship is 
Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan. 228 In the case, Dr. Dahhan 
signed a restrictive covenant-not-to-compete in consideration of his 
employment with the Daniel Boone Clinic ("DBC,,).229 After the 
cessation of his employment, two patients Dr. Dahhan had been 
treating for chronic pulmonary and cardiac problems filed actions 
seeking an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the covenant.230 A 
Kentucky district court issued an opinion stating that the patients 
and general public were third-party beneficiaries of the contract 
between Dr. Dahhan and DBC, and that the patients were thus 
223. Yeager v. Bloomington Obstetrics & Gynecology, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 696, 
698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ind. 
1991». 
224. See, e.g., Cherry v. Crow, 845 F. Supp. 1520, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
225. See Jeffcoat v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 213, 219-20 (Vet. App. 2003). 
226. Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (citing MICH. 
COMPo LAws § 600.1405 (2005». 
227. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text. 
228. 734 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987). 
229. [d. at 489. 
230. [d. at 490. 
HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 231 2006
2006] PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 231 
entitled to timely and adequate notice of termination oftreatment.231 
The appellate court, however, took a different view. The 
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the covenant-not-to-compete, 
stating, "[g]enerally, such provisions are held valid, and not against 
public policy unless the particular circumstances of the case would 
cause serious inequities to result.,,232 When the appellate court 
examined whether enforcing the covenant-not-to-compete would 
cause serious inequities, it found none.233 The appellate court 
neglected the importance of continuity of care, saying the clinic has 
a duty to provide professional care but not a duty to provide a 
physician of the patient's choice or notice of personnel changes.234 
The court went on to . say that patients are merely incidental 
beneficiaries to the employment contract between Dr. Dahhan and 
DBC.235 
Clearly, the two courts were both applying the same general 
law, and both were trying to determine whether the covenant-not-to-
compete would violate public policy. However, the vague definition 
of public policy and the fine line between intended and incidental 
third-party beneficiaries leaves too little guidance for courts to 
determine what is in the public interest. A better approach is for 
courts to modify the rule of reason test to accommodate specific 
analysis of the physician patient relationship under the public policy 
prong. 
Using the public policy prong of the rule of reason analysis, 
courts should consider the impact restrictive covenants may have on 
the patients of a contracting doctor in a more in-depth and multi-
dimensional fashion. Such an approach would require a court to 
make inquiries into the impact that enforcement of a covenant 
would have on individual patients, as well as on the patients of a 
physician challenging an agreement as a whole. As quasi-third-
party beneficiaries to the employment contract, the impact of 
enforcement of a restrictive covenant on patients would become an 
important factor of public policy consideration. For example, a court 
inquiring into the impact that enforcement of a restrictive covenant 
against an oncologist would have on her patients as a class would 
almost universally find continuity of care issues to be so vital in this 
particular field that rescission of the covenant would almost always 
be necessary. On the other hand, a court looking into that same 
impact on a dermatologist would typically find diminished 




234. Id. at 491. 
235. Id. 
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much less likely. By considering the public interest of a class of 
patients, this approach also allows a court to consider the impact a 
restrictive covenant would have on a physician's future patients and 
the general medical needs of a community. 
However, this third-party approach will also allow courts to look 
at physicians' relationships with individual patients, providing for a 
more nuanced version of the rule of reason that allows much more 
flexibility. Rather than make sweeping judgments about the 
relative importance of a physician's specialty, this approach will 
require a court to look at the nature of that physician's relationship 
with his patients. 236 For example, a urologist mayor may not have a 
large percentage of patients for whom enforcement of a covenant 
would bring about disastrous healthcare consequences. 237 By 
protecting the doctor-patient relationship courts will free physicians 
to treat patients who require long-term care without fear that the 
physician will be forced to ignore her medical and ethical 
obligations. Elevation of the individual relationship between doctor 
and patient will force courts to consider this impact on much more of 
a case-by-case basis. Further, it will ultimately result in better, 
more informed opinions that will simultaneously promote the well-
being of patients and the economic interest of physicians. Such 
interests are not, and should not be, diametrically opposed, but the 
current tests that enjoy popularity among courts often treat them as 
such. 
236. Even the most progressive OpInIOnS regarding patient rights have 
declined to look into the details of the contracting physician's relationship with 
her patients. It is unknown, for instance, the extent to which the trial court 
that issued the original Farber opinion relied on any specific information about 
the contracting physician's relationships with his patients or the extreme 
importance that continuity-of-care issues may play in the effectiveness of a 
pulmonologist's treatments. See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 
1277 (Ariz. 1999). The Duffner court apparently saw the plights of individual 
patients or the nature of an orthopedic practice as irrelevant, as neither are 
even briefly mentioned. See Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1986). 
237. For an illustration concerning physicians practicing pediatrics and 
neonatology, see Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133 (Idaho App. 1985). This court, in 
an indirect manner, was actually able to look at relatively detailed information 
regarding the contracting physicians' relationships with at least potential 
patients. See id. at 1136-37. While disruptions in patient relationships with 
pediatricians and neonatal experts mayor may not result in major problems for 
the quality of patient care, this court was able to look at the unique 
circumstances that neonatal specialists in a rural area may experience, and in 
so doing, voided the covenant-not-to-compete for public policy reasons. [d. at 
1137. 
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A. Contracts Should Be Efficient 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the current rule of reason 
approach, a one-size-fits-all approach to all restrictive covenants has 
some support in the legal academy. Many law and economics 
scholars argue that a more flexible rule will be confusing and add 
ambiguity to the contract and its future enforceability.238 These 
scholars contend that clear rules promote efficient transactions, if 
those rules are known, and that contract law can be used to embrace 
them.239 Accordingly, these scholars would likely view this proposed 
change to the evaluation of physician restrictive covenants as rather 
dicey because the parties would have difficulty predicting in 
advance, at least until the law became more settled, whether the 
restrictive covenant would be valid. The current per se rule as 
applied to attorneys and the rule of reason as applied to physicians 
avoids this uncertainty. Currently, there does not exist much 
ambiguity as to whether a physician covenant-not-to-compete will be 
enforced, as most of them will be found reasonable. 240 
My argument is that it is more efficient and fair to permit 
restrictive covenants to exist with judicial limitations. First, 
application of restrictive covenants to physicians seems to be a very 
inefficient way in which to regulate competition for health care 
services in a market. In a small community, there might be only 
two dermatologists. If one tries to be independent but cannot 
because of a restrictive covenant, then the community loses the 
benefit of competition. Surely there are more competition-friendly 
ways of protecting the investment an established doctor makes in a 
new addition to her practice? 
Noncompetition clauses are a result of two competing policies 
that courts must grapple with each time a clause is litigated in 
court: freedom to contract and a policy against restraint of trade.241 
238. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 13 
(1983) ("[TJhe preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the effect of 
transaction costs. These effects include the actual incurring of transaction costs 
and the inefficient choices induced by a desire to avoid transaction costs."). See 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3d ed. 1986) 
(advocating the use of economics in judicial decision making); R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960). For a slightly different 
perspective, see generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. 
L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
239. See generally POSNER, supra note 238. But see generally James M. 
Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974); Jerome M. 
Culp, Judex Economicus, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1987); Mario J. Rizzo, 
The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980). 
240. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text. 
241. See Empirical Study, supra note 41, at 486. 
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According to some scholars, the closest courts have come to 
balancing these policies for noncompete clauses is the rule of 
reason.242 The rule of reason approach is the best solution thus far 
because it seeks to examine the many factors that contribute to each 
of the competing policies.243 Instituting the proposed solution of 
adopting the quasi-third-party beneficiary status will take time like 
any other solution. However, some commentators suggest that time 
is quickly running out to bandage the wounds caused by restrictive 
covenants.244 
Patient choice is being eroded and will likely continue unless 
we stop treating physicians as we do salesmen and make a 
concerted effort to enable patients to choose their physician 
and remain a patient, regardless of the physician's 
employment status. . .. The courts should not compound the 
problem for patients by treating the 'freedom to contract' as a 
higher public good than the right of a patient to choose and 
remain a patient of a particular physician regardless of the 
employment status of that physician.245 
With that consideration in mind, it is essential that courts 
recognize the importance of the flexibility that restrictive covenants 
require in the physician context, and examine covenants on a case-
by-case basis. Although this method may be less judicially efficient, 
it is more efficient in the long run if it can protect patient, physician, 
and practice groups' interests more effectively. 
B. Judicial Discretion 
A second criticism is that the enhanced public policy prong of 
the physician restrictive covenant increases judicial discretion and, 
thus, increases the likelihood that unfair or arbitrary results will 
occur when courts review covenants-not-to-compete for their 
242. [d. at 487. 
243. As one author observed: 
And, allowing reasonable restrictive covenants avoids the inequitable 
results of applying the per se rule. The reasonableness rule enforces 
the parties' expectations, rather than allowing one party to shift the 
costs of complying with public policy to another party. 
The essence of the reasonableness rule is an individualized 
inquiry into the circumstances of the parties to the restrictive 
covenant. 
Draper, supra note 180, at 180. 
244. See Leonard Opperman & Jason R. Burke, The Freedom of Contract us. 
Patient's Rights to Choose: Non-Competition Agreements in Physicians' 
Employment Contracts, RES GESTAE, Sept. 1999, at 24, 30. 
245. [d. at 30. 
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validity.246 Courts will be called on to determine the precise nature 
of the physician's relationship with his or her patients and to 
establish what will be a tolerable level of disruption to this 
relationship. The decision to permit some physician restrictive 
covenants to be enforced, even at the cost of some disruption of the 
physician-patient relationship, necessarily requires an exercise of 
discretion.247 As in any case, a judge's particular sensitivities may 
well determine the level of protection that a physician's patients 
receive. Thus, the implementation of this approach will result in 
some physician-employers believing that their right to contract has 
been unfairly denied or circumscribed and in some physicians 
feeling that their relationship with their patients has been 
undervalued.248 
In the physician context, however, judicial discretion will not 
lead to lesser protection of any physician-patient relationship. The 
new approach creates the opportunity for the physician-patient 
relationship to be viewed in a different manner setting forth a new 
ceiling but not removing the basic rule of reason that exists today. 
Thus, application of the enhanced public policy prong in the rule of 
reason will not leave any physician-patient relationship less 
protected than it is under current law. Instead, this new test would 
provide a higher degree of protection in appropriate circumstances. 
If anything, the existing rule of reason standard is more 
troublesome because it concludes before any balancing occurs that 
all physician-patient relationships enjoy little, if any, protection. 
Judges under the new approach will have to use their discretion 
to characterize the nature of the physician-patient relationship 
involving a physician restrictive covenant claim. Although this task 
is not an easy one and creates the possibility of an arbitrary 
characterization of that relationship (and perhaps a denial of that 
physician-patient relationship in individual cases), the benefits of 
providing greater protection to the physician-patient relationship 
more than compensate for the opportunity cost. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The bond between a physician and her patient is one of the most 
sensitive and important in American society. It is also one of the 
most unique. The attitude that many jurisdictions take when 
246. For a discussion of this line of legal reasoning in general, see Lawrence 
C. George, King Solomon's Judgment Expressing Principles of Discretion and 
Feedback in Legal Rules and Reasoning, 30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1549, 1559-66, 1573-
75 (1979). 
247. See Draper, supra note 180, at 180. 
248. See generally Opperman & Burke, supra note 244. 
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evaluating the degree to which this relationship should be protected 
by law is at best inconsistent, and at worst incoherent and 
insensitive. This does not mean that courts can also disregard 
entirely the economic realities of practicing medicine in America 
today. Courts must therefore also mind the sometimes competing 
interest that the public has in promoting the profitable and stable 
practice of medicine. Unfortunately, one thing that courts of all 
jurisdictions have in common is the lack of a workable judicial 
standard that can effectively allow them to walk the line between 
these two competing public interests. 
The vast majority of the sources cited in this Article, whether 
judicial opinions or scholarly analysis, serve as evidence of the 
current polarized state of the law in the area of physician restrictive 
covenants, espousing either an outright rejection of physician 
restrictive covenants in every instance or, alternatively, employing 
an outdated analysis that is often incapable of achieving any 
meaningful protection for the bond between patient and physician. 
Somewhat ironically, taking sides in this tug-of-war will never solve 
this problem. Instead, courts must be given the proper tools in order 
to evaluate these complex issues in a complete and in-depth manner. 
The third-party beneficiary analysis will serve as the perfect 
instrument for courts to make better and more informed decisions in 
the future. 
